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Legal scholars typically conceive of First Amendment free speech
rights as either expanding or contracting. This is particularly true
when they are writing about or alluding to the history of the freedom
of speech. Narratives concerning that history are usually constructed
around two dynamics that, while not mutually exclusive, are distin-
guishable. The first involves cycles of expansion and contraction.
These narratives draw attention to periods of repression, in which
otherwise prevailing free speech norms are transgressed in reaction
to fears (commonly constructed as excessive) of threats posed by po-
litical opposition, foreign enemies, dangerous ideas or behaviors, or
some combination of these. The most prominent cyclical turns con-
cerning the freedom of speech are familiar: the Alien and Sedition
Acts, the Red Scare, and the McCarthy era are touchstones.' The
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western University School of Law; M.A., Ph.D., Cornell University. Creighton Page, B.A.,
Princeton 2005, provided extensive research assistance. I have benefited from the comments
and criticisms of Jack Balkin, David Bernstein, Rebecca Brown, Michael Kent Curtis, Donald
Downs, Paul Frymer, Howard Gillman, Leslie Goldstein, Mark Graber, Joel Grossman, Ronald
Kahn, Reva Siegel, Robert Post, Keith Whittington, and Mark Tushnet.
' Conservatives, who have had very little influence over the shape of academic narratives
concerning the freedom of speech, may share these touchstones with liberals. However, many
conservatives believe that the ostensible restrictions of the McCarthy era have been exagger-
ated, or that critics of McCarthyism radically underestimate the level of parallel hostility to the
free speech of communists and fellow travelers. Disputes over the proper stance toward
McCarthy and communism more generally were at the core of the political debates amongst the
New York intellectuals at mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., NEIL JUMONVILLE, CRITICAL
CROSSINGS: THE NEW YORK INTELLECTUALS IN POSTWAR AMERICA, at xii (1991) (arguing that
New York intellectuals underwent a critical political reorientation during the Cold War);
RICHARD H. PELLS, THE LIBERAL MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE: AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS IN
THE 1940s AND 1950S 264-65 (2d ed. 1989) (suggesting that many of the intellectuals of the
1940s and 1950s either were complicit with, or did not take a strong enough stand against,
McCarthyism); ALAN M. WALD, THE NEWYORK INTELLECTUALS: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE
ANTI-STALINIST LEFT FROM THE 1930S TO THE 1980S 194-95 (1987) (arguing that "the pressure
on intellectuals to conform during the postwar McCarthy period" caused many of the New York
intellectuals to adopt pro-Cold War stances, creating a rift among the group). These debates
have had no influence within contemporary academia, whose construction of the period is
Manichaean. See, e.g., ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE
UNIVERSITIES 340-41 (1986) (arguing that American academia universally accepted and con-
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second dynamic is of secular, linear progression. This dynamic is
chiefly-and perhaps exclusively-applied to free speech in the twen-
tieth century. Similarly familiar, narratives premised on this dynamic
start with the fledgling beginnings of the Holmes and Brandeis dis-
sents, 2 proceed through the incorporation of free speech as a funda-
mental right, requiring protection against actions of the states, and
tributed to McCarthyism and its disastrous consequences); see also ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE
THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA, at x (1998) ("In order to eliminate the alleged threat
of domestic Communism, a broad coalition of politicians, bureaucrats, and other anticommun-
ist activists hounded an entire generation of radicals and their associates, destroying lives, ca-
reers, and all the institutions that offered a left-wing alternative to mainstream politics and cul-
ture.").
Conservatives, moreover, along with a few dissident liberals, would add to these touchstones
the repressions caused by multiculturalist political correctness beginning in the late 1980s and
continuing through the present. See, e.g., DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, RESTORING FREE SPEECH
AND LIBERTY ON CAMPUS 10-11 (2005) ("[1] nstitutions of higher learning have been busy since
the later 1980s circumscribing and restricting the freedom of speech ... in the name of pro-
moting a variety of causes, including promoting civility and making the university a more hospi-
table place for minorities and other groups considered to be oppressed."); NAT HENTOFF, FREE
SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE: HOW THE AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY
CENSOR EACH OTHER 152 (1992) (arguing that speech codes are "antithetical ... to the idea of
a university" (quoting Benno Schmidt, President, Yale Univ., Speech broadcasted on PBS televi-
sion's Fred Friendly: Safe Speech, Free Speech and the University (June 1980))); ALAN CHARLES
KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON
AMERICA'S CAMPUSES 1-6 (1998) (arguing that political correctness and speech codes have sti-
fled free speech on university campuses). Many believe that the increased willingness of young
people to identify themselves as Republicans, and their resistance to identify themselves as femi-
nists, are partly a reaction to this cycle of repression, which has been most pronounced in sec-
ondary and post-secondary education. See, e.g., Brian C. Anderson, We're Not Losing the Culture
Wars Anymore, CITY JOURNAL, Autumn 2003, available at http://www.city-journal.org/
html/13_4_werenotlosing.html (arguing that the liberal stranglehold over popular media has
been broken by the advent of Fox News, the creation of the internet, and the rise of conserva-
tive book publishers, and that these changes have most pronouncedly affected teenagers and
young adults).
These dissents begin with a key 1919 Red Scare case, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
624-31 (1919), in which justice Holmes argued that several alien dissidents who published arti-
cles critical of the United States government's prosecution of World War I criminals were pro-
tected against charges of treason and espionage by the First Amendment. The dissents persist
in several later cases: Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334-43 (1920), in which Justice
Brandeis argued that a state statute prohibiting the teaching of certain applications of pacifism
violates the First Amendment; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925), in whichJustices
Holmes and Brandeis argued that arrest for publishing a manifesto promoting the overthrow of
government is in contravention of the First Amendment; and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
379 (1927), in which Justices Brandeis and Holmes, in their concurrence, stated that "assem-
bling with a political party, formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by
mass action at some date necessarily far in the future, is... a right within the protection of the
Fourteenth [and, therefore, First] Amendment[s]." See also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (holding that inciting speech is prohibited only if it creates "a clear
and present danger").
Before the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, the Bill of Rights did not constrain the
states. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (holding that
the Bill of Rights does not restrict the conduct of the States). However, once it was ratified, the
Fourteenth Amendment was held, in time, to incorporate some of the Bill of Rights against the
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then chart speech's progress as a "preferred freedom" through dis-
tinct substantive areas as ever more protective doctrine was developed
by the Court. So, for example, protections for speech-plus-conduct
were added, along with related speech-protective doctrine concern-
ing the law of libel . The spaces considered public forums, where
constitutional free speech protections had to be honored, multi-
plied. Moreover, constitutional protections were extended to types
states. See, e.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666 ("[F]reedom of speech and of the press-which are pro-
tected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental
personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment from impairment by the States.").
See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (striking down as unconstitu-
tional a California statute that criminalized the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to
organized government because the statute "might be construed as embracing conduct which
the State could not constitutionally prohibit[,] ... includ[ing] [the] peaceful and orderly op-
position to government by legal means and within constitutional limitations"); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938) (holding that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the dis-
tribution of any textual materials within city limits was unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) (holding that the right to conduct a
peaceful picket at a place of business is protected by the First Amendment); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that the freedom of speech includes the
right of public school students to refrain from pledging allegiance or saluting the flag); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-64 (1958) (holding that disclosure of the names of members of
political groups can only be compelled by a court when there is substantial justification, as such
disclosures operate to inhibit freedom of speech by dissuading association with the groups for
fear of exposure and its subsequent consequences); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266 (1964) (holding that a newspaper that prints a false but constitutionally protected political
advertisement cannot be held answerable for libel, as it "might shut off an important outlet for
the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to
publishing facilities"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(holding that political expression that does not "materially and substantially disrupt" the school
environment cannot be forbidden in a public school setting without violating the constitutional
rights of the students); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the State
could not prohibit Ku Klux Klan members from advocating violence or law breaking unless
such advocacy was intended to and likely would cause imminent lawlessness); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[T]he State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this four-letter expletive a crimi-
nal offense."); see also Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power
and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 625-26 (1994) (positing
that the size and scope of the modern central state led the Supreme Court to ever more zeal-
ously protect individual freedoms, such as the freedom of speech); cf United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that a law that appears on its face to im-
pinge on a specific provision of the Constitution, restricts access to the political process, or dis-
criminates against a "discrete and insular" minority should be reviewed under heightened scru-
tiny). But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (holding that a municipality could
prohibit the use of sound trucks to disseminate information so long as the prohibition was
meant to prevent nuisances); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.").
' See, e.g., Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 106 (outside of places of business); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (in public parks); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)
(outside of state legislatures); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-66 (in paid newspaper advertisements);
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (inside public schools); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94
(1972) (within 150 feet of schools); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (within 500 feet of
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of speech, such as sexual speech and "hate" speech, that had long
been assumed to be beyond the pale.6 The dynamic of secular pro-
gression, as mentioned, does not exclude the possibility of cycles. In
fact, the most familiar narrative of the freedom of speech amongst
legal scholars nestles accounts of cycles within a larger story of long-
term secular expansion.7 While not rejecting the significance of these
dynamics, this Article seeks to demonstrate to legal scholars that a re-
flexive resort to these templates will lead them either to minimize as
arcane, or to overlook entirely, important aspects of the development
of the constitutional law of free speech in the twentieth century.
This Article maps what I contend is an illustrative instance of the
nearly simultaneous expansion and contraction of free speech rights.
Such expansion and contraction was part of the process of forging
and consolidating the modern, post-New Deal political regime.
While traditional narratives see this regime as one characterized by a
cresting solicitude for free speech (absent setbacks foisted upon it by
regime opponents), my study demonstrates the distinctive ways in
which regime supporters publicly committed to and identified with a
foreign embassies). These cases stand in stark contrast to the Court's turn-of-the-century opin-
ion in Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), where the Court held that municipalities had
an absolute right to regulate speech in public places. See id. at 48 ("The right to absolutely ex-
clude all right to use, necessarily includes the authority to determine under what circumstances
such use may be availed of. ").
6 See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-90
(1959) (distribution of film containing sexual immorality and adultery);Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 194-96 (1964) (possession and exhibition of a film containing a love scene); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-68 (1969) (private possession of obscene material); Brandenburg, 395
U.S. at 448-49 (Ku Klux Klan meeting); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-26 (display in a courthouse of the
word "Fuck" on a jacket); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-06 (1989) (flag burning). For
prior historical context, see Roth, 354 U.S. at 481-85, where the Court upheld a conviction for
the mailing of an obscene book and circulars. Justice Brennan stated, "this Court has always
assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press." Id. at 481.
Even Robert Post, who is the most historically sensitive and pluralistic constitutional theorist
writing about the First Amendment, tends toward following the model of secular linear expan-
sion and views this development as progress toward democracy:
American constitutional law is exceptional in the intensity of its commitment to the so-
cial order of democracy. This is most plainly visible in our First Amendment jurispru-
dence, which is demonstrably idiosyncratic among national legal systems because of its
ambition to maintain public discourse free from the control of community norms.
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 9 (1995)
[hereinafter POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS]; see also GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 549
(2004) (arguing that in the twentieth century, the Court has continuously promulgated "more
speech-protective constitutional standards" that have impeded government efforts to suppress
dissent).
' For an important recent example, see STONE, supra note 6, at 532-38, as he highlights
restrictions on American rights during the "Half War" with France, the American Civil War,
World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War, while maintaining that consti-
tutional law has made "substantial progress" toward becoming increasingly protective of civil
liberties.
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program of civil liberties work to constrict freedoms which run
counter to the substantive imperatives of the regime. Regime sup-
porters do so less by assailing free speech rights generally, than by al-
tering categories of the sorts of behaviors considered "speech" and
those not-that is, by altering the definitions of what behaviors con-
stitute free speech controversies in the first place.' I demonstrate this
process at work by looking at the area of legal doctrine that was cen-
tral to the new regime in its formative era: labor law.9 I do this by
mapping the way in which important aspects of labor union activity
once considered "conduct" (such as picketing) were re-classified as
speech, and, at the same time, employer utterances once considered
"speech" were re-classified as "conduct." In a liberal polity such as
the United States, in which a commitment to rights protection has
been a defining imperative,' ° the re-classifications that are most suc-cessful are the ones least likely to be discussed.
, See generally Ken I. Kersch, The New Deal Triumph as the End of History?: The Judicial Negotia-
tion of Labor Rights and Civil Rights, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Kersch, The
New Deal Triumph as the End of Histoy?] (arguing that the institutionalization and assimilation of
the ideas behind the labor movement required an inversion of previously-held beliefs about
"speech" and "conduct").
9 See Karen Orren, The Primacy of Labor in American Constitutional Development, 89 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 377, 377-81 (1995) (positing that "changes in labor relations ... have ... driven major
constitutional change" in areas including judicial review, judicial authority and deference, civil
rights, and substantive due process); see also VICTORIA C. IHATrAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE
POWER: THE ORIGINS OF BUSINESS UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 30-208 (1993) (discussing
how the expansion of labor has led to a "new social history [that has] reinvigorated studies of
American politics" and caused scholarly research on politics to include a "much larger range of
[labor] behavior" than before); KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES:
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (2004) [here-
inafter KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES] (arguing that the Supreme Court's labor deci-
sions in the early twentieth century caused a "radical shift in constitutional doctrine" by institu-
tionalizing group labor rights, as opposed to following an individualist conception); DAVID
PLOTKE, BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORDER: RESHAPING AMERICAN LIBERALISM IN THE
1930S AND 1940s, at 121-27 (1996) (arguing that the passage and upholding of the National
Labor Relations Act produced "a new leading political force and an expanding state," which set
the stage for the subsequent strengthening of labor unions); Steve Fraser, The "Labor Question,"
in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 55, 68-69 (Steve Fraser & Gary
Gerstle eds., 1989) (noting the shifts in the legal status of labor during the 1930s from a "grim"
outlook following the Schecter decision to the positive developments of the "second New Deal,"
highlighted by the Wagner Act).
'o See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
5-17 (1991) (discussing the American obsession with rights and freedoms, which are viewed as
being "absolute, individual, and independent of any necessary relation to responsibilities"); J.
DAVID GREENSTONE, THE LINCOLN PERSUASION: REMAKING AMERICAN LIBERALISM 35 (1993)
(describing a theory of American cultural consensus consisting of "a belief in individual free-
dom, private enterprise, and republican institutions founded on popular consent"); LOUIS
HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 285 (1955) ("[T]he psychic heritage of a nation 'born free'
is... a colossal liberal absolutism .... ").
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In demonstrating how conduct became speech and how speech
became conduct in post-New Deal labor law, I borrow from (and at-
tempt to contribute to) the stock of insights of the growing group of
historically-oriented political scientists associated with the study of
American Political Development ("APD"). This group of APD schol-
ars devotes its efforts to sharpening our understanding of the dynam-
ics of institutional stability and change across time." Drawing upon
foundational APD models of institutional development, I argue here
that the process of simultaneous expansion and contraction of consti-
tutional rights is related to the process of building and consolidating
a broader political regime.12 I argue, in addition, that this process of
simultaneous expansion and contraction is a part of the heavily ideo-
logical process of constructing the regime's substantive programs as
" Both the empirical and theoretical insights of APD work should be of interest to legal
scholars. APD differs from empirical work arising out of the behavioralist approach to political
science in the 1950s, which prominent scholars have recently been pushing upon law profes-
sors. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 312-26 (2002) (presenting an attitudinal model, which "holds
that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-A-vis the ideological
attitudes and values of the justices," to explain how the Court makes its decisions); Lee Epstein
& Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 114-15 (2002) (providing a series of
recommendations for law schools and the legal community to improve conducting empirical
research). APD scholars take law and legal doctrine seriously, and view them as highly relevant
to the decisions made by political actors, including-and perhaps especially-judges. They
share with other political scientists the conviction that law is in some sense policy and politics,
but not in the crude way that behavioralists tend to suppose (i.e., judges vote their policy pref-
erences and use legal verbiage as a smokescreen).
Discovering the ways in which law and politics interact, and, indeed, are mutually constitu-
tive of each other, is at the core of the public law APD project. See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT
AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8 (manuscript at 26, on file with editors)
(presenting a collection of essays by APD scholars, which contribute to the "understanding [of]
the relationship between law and politics by refusing to isolate questions involving legal doc-
trines and judicial decisions and the special qualities of courts as decision-making units from
the consideration of developments elsewhere in the political system"). For overviews of APD as
a distinctive approach to the study of politics, see generally KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2004) [hereinafter ORREN
& SKOWRONEK, SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT]; PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN
TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004) [hereinafter PIERSON, POLITICS IN
TIME]; and Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, The Study of American Political Development, in
POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 722, 722-54 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V.
Milner eds., 2002).
" See, e.g., RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900, at 314-54 (2000) (arguing that the different stances taken on
constitutional economic rights, such as the reach of the Commerce Clause and the Sherman
Antitrust Act, by the various political parties of the late nineteenth century were caused by the
parties' desires to attain post-Civil War political and economic dominance); Howard Gillman,
How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States,
1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 521-22 (2002) (arguing that increased judicial power
and conservatism in the late nineteenth century was not court-inspired but rather was a form of
partisan entrenchment that arose out of Republican Party efforts to gain political control and to
promote economic nationalism).
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constitutionally authoritative and, hence, legitimate. 3  Moreover,
again drawing from seminal theoretical work on the nature of politi-
cal development, I argue that regimes and the processes of building
and legitimating them are complex affairs characterized by "multiple
orders" and patterns of intercurrence, which are thick with institu-
tions and authoritative relationships of diverse temporal origins and
solidity. Drawing upon the theoretical insights of both APD and
comparative politics scholars on the relationship between social
movements (such as the labor movement, the civil rights movement,
and the women's movement) and the state, sequencing, and path
dependency, I furthermore provide an account of the relationship
between law and the regime that is not static but dynamic-a charac-
teristic feature of developmental models. The result is not a study of
simple "expansion" or "contraction" of free speech rights, but a mov-
ing picture of the free speech "configurations" that were developed
in the process of building and consolidating the modern liberal, New
Deal political, and constitutional order. 
4
" See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 243-45 (1996) [hereinafter NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE] (describing
how the new liberal ideology of the late nineteenth century-which emphasized legal centrali-
zation of state power, individual freedom, and personal autonomy-led to the creation of a
"new American constitutionalism"); William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American
State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAw'S CENTURY 249, 249-83 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) (arguing
for the need to study the role of law and legal ideology to understand how "the creation of a
decidedly new liberal constitutional state" occurred). See generally THEODOREJ. LOWI, THE END
OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 272-79 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing
that interest-group liberalism, beginning in the Roosevelt-New Deal period and culminating in
the 1960s, brought about a Second Republic that made "the strong national state a positive vir-
tue" and embraced the shift from Congress-centered to executive-centered power); ORREN &
SKOWRONEK, SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11, at 28 ("Liberal
ideology has been offered up as an explanation of continuity and adaptability in political cul-
ture, in political institutions, and between the two; it has also served as a foil for highlighting
evidence of disjunction, contradiction, and provincial foreclosure of other programs and world-
views."); Wayne D. Moore, (Re)Construction of Constitutional Authority and Meaning: The Fourteenth
Amendment and Slaughter-House Cases, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8 (manuscript at 265, on file with editors) (arguing that the antebel-
lum fight over the validity and construction of the Fourteenth Amendment was as much based
on political constituency considerations as it was on legal considerations); Stephen Skowronek,
Order and Change, 28 POLITY 91 (1995) (demonstrating the influential role of institutions,
through their "capacity to congeal and organize, to infuse social life with durable norms and
dependable structures," in shaping politics).
"4 See PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME, supra note 11, at 1-2 ("Contemporary social scientists typi-
cally take a 'snapshot' view of political life, but there is often a strong case to be made for shift-
ing from snapshots to moving pictures."). Robert C. Post also uses the term "configurations,"
albeit in a slightly different sense than I use it here. See POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra
note 6, at 12 (referring to "the ways in which management, community, and democracy each
imply distinct configurations of persons and of the social worlds those persons inhabit").
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I. MOVING BEYOND "RIGHTS AS TRUMPS"
The developmental approach I adopt here cuts against the most
prominent approach to First Amendment rights (and, for that mat-
ter, to constitutional rights generally) taken by late twentieth century
liberal constitutional theorists. That approach, propagated most ex-
haustively by Ronald Dworkin, treats rights chiefly as "trumps," ad-
ministered by countermajoritarian courts with the aim of restraining
state power. My approach, by contrast, which I have recently articu-
lated at length as a general theory applicable to a broad array of doc-
trinal areas, understands rights in the modern American state to be
just as commonly the handmaidens of state power as constitutional
trumps which limit it.'6 I take rights declarations to be the building
blocks of the modern American political regime.17 Within that re-
gime, it is certainly true that limitations on power will be articulated
and justified in terms of rights. But-crucially-it is also true that
expansions of state power will be similarly justified. 8 The task for de-
velopmentally inclined scholars will involve building a body of knowl-
edge that fixes the precise ways in which rights talk is used to justify
'5 See RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193 (1977) ("There would be no point
in the boast that we respect individual rights unless that involved some sacrifice, and the sacri-
fice in question must be that we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would receive
from overriding these rights when they prove inconvenient."); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing the "countermajoritarian" nature of the power of judicial review in evaluating and
guarding constitutional values).
" See KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 25 ("Rather than treating
[the civil rights and civil liberties] jurisprudence [of the mid- to late-twentieth century] ... as
the triumph of principle.., because it is suffused with rights talk... as a categorical limitation
on the state, I consider the rights creation undertaken in the wake of the New Deal standoff to
be heavily implicated in the process of building the New American State and in the process of
consolidating and legitimizing its authority and its power."); Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of
Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American State, 16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 87 (2002)
[hereinafter Kersch, Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights] (positing that "[c]onstitutional
change involving the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries redefined traditional protections of privacy [rights] in the interest of progress, of the
construction of the modern American liberal state").
" See SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL 305 (1993) ("[T] he concept of rights has become
increasingly associated with the expansion of national administrative power .... ").
"8 See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 101-02 (1995) (explainingJean Bodin's theory that limited government can para-
doxically increase the capabilities of states, and that this "idea that state capacities can be
sharply increased by strategic limitations on power turns out to be a fundamental premise of
liberal-democratic thought"); NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE, supra note 13, at 245 ("One of
the oddest things about the legal centralization of state power in late nineteenth-century Amer-
ica was... its heightened regard for individual rights and liberties.... [T] he law and language
of individual rights were not antagonistic to state building."); Kersch, Reconstruction of Constitu-
tional Privacy Rights, supra note 16, at 63 (explaining how reconstructing constitutional privacy
rights led to the successful building of the "new American state").
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particular configurations of state power that simultaneously work to
empower and limit the state in the service of the regime's particular
substantive goals.' 9
This developmental approach promises untapped synergies be-
tween a dynamic group of political scientists and the work of an in-
fluential cohort of historically oriented, post-monist, post-CLS consti-
tutional theorists concerned with the political dynamics of the law,
such as Robert Post, Jack Balkin, Reva Siegel, and Sanford Levinson. 2o
Whereas the previous generation of critical students of the politics of
law (and some of this generation, earlier in their careers) were in-
spired by an anti-capitalist political project of leftist law reform, these
scholars pursue a more dispassionate intellectual agenda aimed at
developing an empirical understanding of the relationship between
the development of constitutional doctrine and the dynamics of his-
torical change. Their greater detachment from a fixed reform
agenda has freed them to look at the dynamics of constitutional
change generally through a prism of a wider set of scholarly problems
than their critical predecessors. 2' Their focus on "history as theory"
" See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1279 (1995)
[hereinafter Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine] (arguing that "rights ought not to be
regarded as the private attachments of persons or entities, but rather as the instruments by
which the law locates, defines, and sustains desirable social practices").
Monist constitutional theory (or, as Duncan Kennedy has dubbed it, "fancy theory")
strives to derive a menu of constitutionally protected rights philosophically from a single foun-
dational principle. Critical Legal Studies, or "CLS," mounted a radical challenge to this project
with a critique of law as a thoroughly politicized instrument of power. Although CLS was po-
tentially broad in its uses, in a reflection of its Marxist origins, it tended to focus heavily on cri-
tiques of capitalism, and did not challenge the presuppositions of liberal legalism across the full
range of possible fronts. See Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178-228 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (describing
the Fancy Theory as "the project of the milieu of elite legal academic intellectuals self-
consciously concerned with universalizing the interests of various oppressed or disadvantaged
groups" and presenting the CLS Critique of Rights, which "operates at the uneasy juncture of
two distinct... enterprises, which I call the left and the modernist/postmodernist projects," as
an alternative account of the role of rights in American legal consciousness).
2 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON,JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5-12 (2001) (analyz-
ing the effect of political theory on the Supreme Court's role in implementing the Constitution,
and arguing that the Court performs a more multifaceted implementation-requiring collabo-
ration, pragmatical analysis, "moral reading," and accommodation-rather than solely search-
ing for the Constitution's "one true meaning"); J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over
Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 870-71 (1993) (putting forth the concept of "ideological drift":
that "theories of jurisprudence[) and theories of constitutional interpretation do not have a
fixed normative or political valence[, but that] ... legal ideas and symbols will change their po-
litical valence as they are used over and over again in new contexts");Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1052-53, 1067-68
(2001) (evaluating the Rehnquist Court's constitutional revolution-a systematic reappraisal of
doctrines concerning federalism, racial equality, and civil rights"-to be the result of political
entrenchment); Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 19, at 1255 (arguing that
the Supreme Court does not, as it claims, arrive at its First Amendment decisions by balancing
the individual's rights with those of the government, but rather that the Court determines its
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(as opposed to the now well-worn territory, within the constitutional
theory of rights, involving the identification and implications of bed-
rock philosophical principles) promises to make novel contributions
to our understanding of American constitutional law.22
A. The Architecture of Modern Free Speech Law: The Traditional
Architecture from a Developmental Perspective
When legal scholars think of the secular, linear expansion of the
freedom of speech, they typically conceive of speech along three dis-
tinct dimensions. The first involves the content or substance of the
ideas or messages being conveyed. Some types of content, for exam-
ple political speech, are considered "core" content, with a special
value in liberal democratic political systems.22 Other types, such as ar-
tistic or commercial speech, though important in diverse ways, are of-
24ten held to have less foundational value. Some content has beenheld to have little or no value, or even be positively harmful, such as
cases "by deciding what kind of social practice ought to obtain constitutionality in the circum-
stances of... speech"); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidis-
crimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444 (2000) (questioning "the
court-centered model of constitutional interpretation that these decisions [on antidiscrimina-
tion legislation promulgated pursuant to the Commerce Clause] assume, examining the rela-
tionship between Court and Congress that actually shaped the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause in recent decades[, and] argu[ing] that this history justifies a continuing role for de-
mocratic vindication of equality values").
See POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 6, at 16 ("[W]e will comprehend a good
deal more about the shape of our actual First Amendment jurisprudence by understanding the
connection of speech to the specific social orders of democracy, community, and management
than by searching for any general free speech principle."); see also PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME,
supra note 11, at 2 (emphasizing the importance of temporal analysis to understanding political
and social outcomes, while arguing that studying politics from an "ahistorical vantage point"
fails to provide a complete "understanding of complex social dynamics").
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open"); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
24-25 (1948) (asserting that freedom of discussion over matters of public policy is essential in a
self-governing society); see also KEN I. KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
UNDER THE LAW 21-22 (2003) [hereinafter KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH] (arguing that effec-
tive self-government needs free speech for the purpose of political debate because open debate
"prevent[s] powerful interests from imposing intellectual and institutional stagnation on the
community.... [allows] dissenters of all sorts [to be] free to challenge the status quo and make
the case for social change[,] ... force[s] us to better understand why some old ideas and insti-
tutions are worth preserving[, and] ... serves as a check on the arbitrary exercise or abuse of
power").
24 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
20 (1971) ("Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly po-
litical. There is no basis forjudicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it
scientific [or] literary. ...").
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"fighting words," obscenity, or libel. The second dimension of
speech that informs discussions of its secular expansion involves the
form of the speech. Whereas the substantive dimension is focused on
the message of the speech, the form involves the manner in which
that message is delivered. Traditionally, the core delivery mechanism
in free speech law has been "pure speech" or verbal utterances.26
However, as other delivery mechanisms were held to fall within the
ambit of free speech law, freedom of speech was increasingly under-
stood to involve a broader "freedom of expression," and categories
such as speech-plus-conduct, expressive conduct, and symbolic ex-
pression were developed.2' The third dimension involves the institu-
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1986) (holding that
a city ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters was constitutional under the First Amend-
ment because there was a substantial government interest in preventing the secondary effects of
such a business); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (incorporating the de-
piction of sexual conduct at "adult" theaters into the scope of obscene material that states may
regulate, as long as it is within the limits designed to prevent First Amendment infringement);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (holding that obscene material, as defined by
contemporary community standards and not national standards, is not protected by the First
Amendment and can be regulated by the states); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 493
(1957) (upholding the federal obscenity statute which prohibits mailing obscene material);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (upholding the constitutionality of a
state statute forbidding the public use of "fighting words," those words likely to cause violence
or a breach of the peace); KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 127 ("[T]he Court
has long distinguished unprotected low-value speech from protected high-value speech. 'Ob-
scenity,' for example, is speech, but the Court nonetheless has deemed obscenity to be low-
value speech, having so little worth as to fall outside constitutional protections. The Court has
similarly declared 'fighting words' a form of unprotected speech. . . ."). But see Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 283 (requiring proof of actual malice to award damages for libel against public officials
about their official conduct); DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY
20 (1989) (noting that, although the Supreme Court has ruled that sexual expression is gener-
ally not protected by the First Amendment, enforcement in that area has been a low priority);
ROCHELLE GURSTEIN, THE REPEAL OF RETICENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CULTURAL AND
LEGAL STRUGGLES OVER FREE SPEECH, OBSCENITY', SEXUAL LIBERATION, AND MODERN ART 281-
87 (1996) (surveying Supreme Court pornographyjurisprudence and finding that pornography
is protected under the First Amendment as long as there is some redeeming social value to the
material); KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 147 (arguing that the Sullivan deci-
sion "fundamentally transformed the entire orientation of the courts toward free speech" by
forcing the courts to compromise its categorical protected versus unprotected speech approach
in favor of a "policy of openness," which analyzed the circumstances of each case to determine
what "concrete effects a pro-speech ruling would have on openness, both in that area and in the
wider culture").
N See KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 144 (contrasting "'pure speech,' or
solely verbal expression" with activities such as sit-ins that constitute "speech plus, or the convey-
ing of a message through either conduct or the display of symbols").
27 E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-04 (1940) (holding that the right to conduct
a peaceful picket at a place of business is protected under the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding that political expression that
does not materially disrupt the school environment cannot be forbidden in a public school set-
ting); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (affirming a Ku Klux Klan leader's right
to advocate crime as a political tool as long as it does not incite imminent lawless action); Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989) (finding that flag burning constitutes expressive con-
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tion or body against which constitutional free speech protections ap-
ply. As is widely remarked upon, the First Amendment applies by its
plain language to laws passed by Congress only. Strictly speaking, this
leaves open the question of whether it would also apply to regulations
promulgated by administrative and executive agencies, or to discre-
tionary executive actions. Moreover, by its plain language, at least,
the First Amendment does not seem to apply to the conduct of the
states. It also does not apply to restrain the action of private actors
and institutions. Over the course of the twentieth century, however,
free speech protections, as measured along these dimensions, have
expanded. Whereas the First Amendment's scope was once limited
to actions by the federal government, those protections now apply to
a wide variety of actions by both the federal and state governments.
In addition, under certain conditions and where connected to gov-
ernment, First Amendment protections are applicable to some pri-
vate individuals and administrative bodies.8
When scholars, and even the general public, think of the secular
expansion of the freedom of speech, they may think of the way in
which the number of types, forms, and institutions to which the First
Amendment now applies has augmented over the course of the twen-
tieth century. So, for example, whereas free speech protections were
largely focused on core political speech in the early twentieth cen-
tury, they were expanded to protect other forms of speech, such as
(anti) religious (blasphemy), sexual (indecency), artistic, commer-
cial, and other forms of speech. In this regard, we can say that free
speech protections expanded: more types of substantive utterances
became constitutionally protected. A similarly additive understand-
ing of expansion applies to the speech's form. Whereas protections
along this dimension tended initially to focus on pure speech, over
the century's course additional means of delivery (like symbolic
speech) were added. Similar dynamics took place concerning the ac-
tors and institutions covered by constitutional free speech law.
duct protected by the First Amendment, absent a compelling state interest in regulating the
non-speech element that is unrelated to the suppression of expression); see also KERSCH,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 144-51 ("Many people now interpreted stirring up trou-
ble, making unpopular arguments, shocking the complacent, and fomenting disorder as acts of
courage and as engines of progress [that were protected under the First Amendment] .... It
was in this context that many people came to prefer the phrase 'freedom of expression' to the
phrase 'freedom of speech.' 'Speech,' they thought, was too limiting. 'Expression,' after all,
encompassed not just the spoken word but also conduct that conveyed both ideas and emo-
tions.").
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1991) (conducting a free speech analysis
on the Department of Health and Human Services' regulations, which limit the ability of Title
X grant recipients to discuss abortion-related family planning, but ultimately holding that the
Secretary's construction of Title X did not violate the First Amendment).
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Given this conceptual structure, it is clear whence the predomi-
nant narratives of the history of the freedom of speech derive. The
origins of the narrative of secular, linear progression are patent: the
number of substantive categories and forms protected multiplied,
and the number of governments and institutions restrained grew.
Somewhat less self-evident are the ways in which this conceptual
structure interacts with cycles of expansion and contraction. In the
context of long-term secular, linear progression, hesitance or refusal
to continue the momentum by adding new categories of speech pro-
tection in substance or form may be seen as a form of contraction.
Actual contractions, of course, are theoretically possible. Some ideas
advocated by conservatives can be conceived of as contractions of the
freedom of speech. In particular, in the context of the additive pro-
liferation of free speech protections, conservatives who are commit-
ted to anchoring constitutional interpretation in either original in-
tent or original understandings of the First Amendment and/or
readings of free speech rights emphasizing the collective public good
have advocated ideas that can only be conceived of as contractions of
the freedom of speech.9 It is significant, however, that, at least in the
form they have been advocated, efforts to cut the number of free
speech categories seem to have been political non-starters. This resis-
tance is a testament to the degree to which the categories (what
Howard Gillman has called "rubrics")5 ° that comprise the architecture
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 24, at 28 (arguing that only explicitly political speech-"speech
about how we are governed,... includ[ing] a wide range of evaluation, criticism, electioneer-
ing and propaganda"-deserves First Amendment protection, while constitutional protection
should not extend to "scientific, educational, commercial or literary expressions"); cf IRVING
KRISTOL, Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship, in REFLECTIONS OF A
NEOCONSERVATVE: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING AHEAD 43, 44-45 (1983) ("We all believe that
there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the 'self-expression'
of an individual or a group, even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic
expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults .... No society
can be utterly indifferent to the ways its citizenry publicly entertain themselves .... And the
question we face with regard to pornography and obscenity is whether, now that they have such
strong protection from the Supreme Court, they can or will brutalize and debase our citi-
zenry."). See generally WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1976) (suggesting that the Court has, in the past century, expanded the scope of
the First Amendment to bounds never intended by the Founding Fathers).
Howard Gillman, Professor of Political Sci. & Law, Univ. of S. Cal., Preferred Freedoms:
Supreme Court Politics and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, Paper presented
at the University of Maryland/Georgetown Constitutionalism Discussion Group (Apr. 2002)
(manuscript at 5, on file with author) ("I use the term constitutional 'rubrics' to refer to the
concepts, doctrines, or tests that justices or advocates recommend as ways of directing decision-
making over certain issues."); see also Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Re-
gimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 315-16 (2002) (arguing that
the decision making of justices, while influenced by ideological attitudes, remain strongly af-
fected by jurisprudential regimes, and testing this approach through using the free speech con-
tent-neutrality jurisprudence to prove that even as the Court has consistently become more con-
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of modern free speech law have become institutionalized. Law pro-
fessors may attribute this resistance to the power of precedent. Po-
litical development scholars would frame the issue more broadly and
speak of path dependency: the dynamics by which deviation from the
path (at least in the naked manner advocated by Bork, Berns, and
Kristol 1 ) would be perceived byjudges as increasingly costly no mat-
ter what the judge's political stripe. Since the days of the abstract
and undifferentiated "bad tendency" test of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the doctrinal architecture of free speech
law has become more complex and the costs of abandoning it in-
crease. In significant part, this is because it provides a framework
that has proven useful in the resolution of problems. The framework
"worked" in some sense because it reflected pragmatic wisdom: it ar-
rived in the spirit of the fact-focused, problem-solving common law
development which considers a stream of concrete cases over time.
Many have argued that the fashioning of rules in this incremental way
is likely to be efficient, and may even be predisposed to wisdom. 3  On
a larger scale, a political development approach would note that, in
its conceptual leaps, the modern architecture of constitutional free
speech was constructed under the impetus of the broader develop-
servative since the liberal doctrine's establishment, the justices continue to "take seriously
the ... content-neutralityjurisprudential regime").
" See supra note 29.
32 See PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME, supra note 11, at 43 (arguing that political public policies
and political formal institutions are difficult to upend because they are created by politicians
who want to demonstrate a "credible commitment[]" to party initiatives while preventing the
"political uncertainty" of leaving options for future, possibly hostile, politicians); Paul Pierson,
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 251, 252 (2000)
("This conception of path dependence, in which preceding steps in a particular direction in-
duce further movement in the same direction, is well captured by the idea of increasing returns.
In an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the same path increases
with each move down that path.... [T]he costs of exit--of switching to some previously plausi-
ble alternative-rise."); Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political
Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72, 78-79 (2000) ("There are.., strong grounds for believing
that self-reinforcing processes are in fact very widespread in political life.... [Path depend-
ency] arguments have been applied to demonstrate the role of timing and sequencing in im-
portant political processes.... When a path dependent process is at work, early developments
get deeply embedded in a particular environment, modifying the incentive structures and
hence behaviors of social actors, and thereby changing the social significance or pattern of un-
folding events or processes occurring later in the sequence.").
" See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
259 (1999) (arguing thatjudicial minimalism-the practice of promulgating narrow holdings-
is a rational response to "the sheer practical problem of obtaining consensus amid pluralism"
and upholds pluralistic ideals "by allowing opinion to coalesce over time and by spurring proc-
esses of democratic deliberation"). See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
(1960) (describing the subtle processes affecting the development of law over time); JAMES R.
STONER, JR., COMMON-LAw LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2003) (argu-
ing that the incremental process of common law has ultimately had a positive and profound
effect on the development of constitutional law).
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mental events that built the modem state. A significant amount of
modern free speech doctrine was forged by the Court in cases involv-
ing the labor movement, the civil rights movement, and increased
protection for religious minorities and political dissenters. 4 To chal-
lenge currently settled categories of free speech doctrine is, in some
sense, to publicly challenge each of these substantive political
achievements. Indeed, it is quite possible that allegations in legal
briefs and oral arguments and, more generally, allegations within po-
litical discourse of "turning back the clock" to the days of the Red
Scare, the McCarthy era, and putting blacks in the back of the bus
signal the sorts of political arguments that are likely to make re-
trenchment especially costly. To dismantle the rubrics would not
only be to take on particular policies, but to take on a collective
memory of historical constitutional progress that, in many respects,
forms the core of the "constitutive story" of the modern American na-
tion.35
It is always possible, of course, that the regime will change. Some
argue that since 1980 it has. But until the Republican Party takes on
not only particular doctrines, but the very memory of the achieve-
ments of twentieth century constitutionalism itself, it is unlikely that
even the Court's conservatives will do so. This memory itself has an
m See generally HARRY KALVEN,JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1965) (giving a
broad overview of how the African American civil rights movement spurred the development of
First Amendment rights related to group defamation, control of political groups, and speech-
plus-conduct actions); KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 97-160 (giving a histori-
cal perspective of advances in the freedom of speech made during the twentieth century);
LUCAS A. POWE,JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 303-57 (2000) (outlining the
development of free speech during the Warren Court in the areas of libel, political protest, and
obscenity); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1, 39-42 (1996) (arguing that the development of free speech rights relating to the labor
movement and the civil rights movement were the result of the increasingly popular support for
the underlying goals of those movements).
'" See KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 16 ("To a significant extent,
the story of modern American constitutionalism is one of the choices [made by] reformers
aligned with the cause of 'progress' ....."); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 6 (1997) (arguing that political leaders must offer civic
ideologies, or myths of civic identity, "and support citizenship laws that express those ideologies
symbolically" in order to mobilize public support); see also POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,
supra note 6, at 17 ("[Courts] simply follow stare decisis, which ensures that the border between
social domains will remain relatively stable. Stare decisis makes it probable that given aspects of
social life will be analyzed according to generally consistent forms of judicial logic,
and.., helps provide constitutional adjudication with the appearance of 'normal science.' But
stare decisis can be broken, and the boundary between social domains can always be contested.");
ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF POLITICAL
MEMBERSHIP 34 (2003) ("In the last two centuries, many modem nationalist leaders have ad-
vanced ... 'horizontal, unified' visions of peoplehood as justifications for their authority, espe-
cially but not exclusively democratic ones.").
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institutionalizing effect.3 6 For these reasons, the current doctrinal ar-
chitecture for free speech law is likely to remain relatively stable and
path dependent. Even conservatives will tend to work within it. Of
course, this does not mean that cycles will no longer occur. What it
does mean, however, is that they are likely to appear under the guise
of interpretive controversies within the pre-existing categories or over
further categorical expansion. Put otherwise, debates over free
speech doctrine will tend to appear less in the guise of normative de-
bates over the justifiability of various doctrinal categories than the
applicability of them to concrete situations. 7 This history and this
context, which reinforce these tendencies, make it difficult for schol-
ars to think about free speech in new ways, or even to "see" distinctive
free speech configurations. In such an order, the important changes
will often take place via sub-rosa shifts within the pre-existing catego-
ries themselves.
B. How Conduct Became Speech
In the constitutional law of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the conceptual categories providing the architecture for
contemporary law of the freedom of speech did not exist. As far as
substance was concerned, speech was not analyzed according to a
rigid taxonomy that affected hermetic analytical separations between,
for example, political, artistic, and commercial speech. As for form,
the emphasis was squarely on what today is known as "pure speech,"
with actions, however expressive, treated as fully regulable by law.
The prevailing constitutional standard was set by the amorphous "bad
tendency" test, according to which the government, pursuant to its
police powers to protect the public health, safety, and morals, was
granted full authority to restrict speech having a "bad tendency"-
that is, speech that was harmful to the public interest.8 Needless to
say, given its approach to free speech substance and form and the
M See generally KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9 (outlining the manner
in which trends in constitutional history can become part of current constitutional thought).
" These debates are likely to take place, that is, within the domain of law directed at estab-
lishing community, which, as Post notes, is only one of law's domains. See POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 6, at 3 (arguing that "constitutional law divides social life
into the discrete domains of community, management, and democracy").
' See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 132-47 (1997) (discussing the
judicial practice between the Civil War and World War I that permitted "the punishment of
publications for their tendency to harm the public welfare"); Gillman, supra note 4, at 639-40
(recognizing that, from the mid 1800s to the early 1900s,judicial inquiry into a statute's consti-
tutionality focused on whether the statute promoted the general good, rather than the statute's
effect on specific individual liberties).
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doctrinal test it applied, the constitutional law of this era was, by con-
temporary standards, highly deferential to government power.9
This is not to say, though, that the conceptual categories of sub-
stance and form, which eventually came to structure constitutional
free speech law in the aftermath of the 1937 "Constitutional Revolu-
tion," did not exist in the broader political culture. As many scholars
have noted, the American Constitution, from its inception, has played
a unique role in the nation's public life, serving as a touchstone (and,
indeed, a framework) for political arguments and a rallying cry for
political causes, political resistance, and social and reform move-
ments.4" This was certainly true for the First Amendment's free
" See KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 90 ("[In the early twentieth century,]
First Amendment arguments used against.., legal restrictions on obscenity had almost no legal
purchase in U.S. courts. The practice of the time was to allow legislatures considerable latitude
to ban materials that had 'a bad tendency.' And the Bad Tendency test, as it was called, was not
at all difficult to meet."); RABBAN, supra note 38, at 47 (noting that the courts gave "great defer-
ence to the 'police power' of the legislators and administrators to determine the tendency of
speech [to harm the public interest]"); Gillman, supra note 4, at 639-40 (arguing that because
the Court viewed free speech cases during World War I as involving the "promotion[I of com-
munity health, safety, and morality," the Court conferred great latitude to Congress to suppress
dissent). See generally MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY
OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 84 (1991) (recounting how "many early twentieth-century jurists" be-
lieved that "congressional decisions limiting political dissent 'should be respected by the courts
unless palpably unreasonable'") (internal citation omitted); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAw 17-25 (3d ed., New York, E. B. Clayton &James Van Norden 1836) (discussing
how the states may prohibit the publication of truthful news articles if the press was acting with
malicious intent, or if such articles would disturb the peace, inflame passions, or excite re-
venge); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 732-33
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) ("[The First] [A]mendment imports no more, than that
every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions ... so always, that he does
not injure any other person ... and ... does not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to
subvert the government.... [T]his reasonable limitation is not only right in itself, but it is an
inestimable privilege in a free government.").
o See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 19 (2000) ("The tradition em-
phasized that free speech is crucial for individual transformation and progressive social change.
[For example,] [a]bolitionists claimed free speech even though many of them thought of them-
selves as discussing slavery as a matter of religion and morals, not as a political question."); NEAL
DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 192 (2004) ("During th[e] period
[from the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts through the McCarthy era], the only meaningful check
on government overreaching was the desire of the American people to be able to speak out-
and hear others speak out-on controversial issues. Politically unpopular prosecutions of
prominent Republicans under the Alien and Sedition Acts contributed to Thomas Jefferson's
victory overJohn Adams and, with it, the repudiation of the Sedition Act. Likewise, post World
War I fears of totalitarianism helped fuel what has become the modern civil liberties move-
ment."); KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 77-81, 122-25 (presenting the concept
of free speech as a rallying point and a powerful weapon in such American social movements as
abolitionism and the labor movement); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8-9 (2004) ("The Constitution... is a species of
law-special only inasmuch as it sets the boundaries within which politics takes place.... [W]e
are inclined today 'to see politics as working within a constitutional order rather than working
out that constitutional order.'" (quoting GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS
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speech protection, which has had a life outside the courts every bit as
significant (and, until recently, probably more so) than it had within
them. Indeed, the attention of many legal historians and political
development scholars is directed toward tracing when and in what
ways constitutional thought in the broader social and political culture
outside the courts came to influence the shape and trajectory of con-
stitutional development within them.4 For example, the relatively
amorphous shape of free speech doctrine in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century meant that many individuals at different times
argued prominently for some sort of special value for politicalS45--  • 43 4
speech, artistic or sexual expression, blasphemy,4 or that con-
15 (2002)); CHRISTINE STANSELL, AMERICAN MODERNS: BOHEMIAN NEW YORK AND THE
CREATION OF A NEW CENTURY 73-119 (2000) (detailing how free speech fueled an ambition
among New York bohemians to engage in focused conversations on such topics as women's
rights, political liberty, and free love, which in turn strongly impacted both politics and cul-
ture); SANDRA F. VANBURKLEO, "BELONGING TO THE WORLD": WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 164, 172-73, 195, 284 (2001) (documenting how rights protected by
the Constitution were offered to justify or oppose feminist movements as varied as the anti-
polygamy crusades, and campaigns for universal suffrage and co-educational institutions of
learning).
4 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 252-67 (2002) (contend-
ing that the American populace came to construe the Constitution's guarantee of religious lib-
erty as mandating the separation of church and state and segregating religion from other activi-
ties, and noting that this viewpoint ultimately had an impact on judicial decisions); THOMAS M.
KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIsT SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL
CONSERVATISM 13 (2004) (attributing the "mixed pattern of conservative success on the
Rehnquist Court... to the interaction between relatively autonomous legal ideas and partisan
developments in national politics"); KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 84-85 (con-
necting the post-Civil War rise of a group of conservative libertarians, who wrote "vigorous theo-
retical defense [s] of free speech rights" based on the belief in limited government, to the Su-
preme Court's subsequent limitations on the government's power to regulate speech activities);
MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION
13-14 (1994) (arguing that pay equity activists achieve advancements in wage discrimination by
engaging in legal mobilization, a process of achieving legal change through "effective uses of
litigation to publicize the equity issue,... nurtur[ing] a growing 'rights of consciousness'
among working women.... organiz[ing] them in defiant action for change," mobilizing legal
resources, and using legal tactics to pressure employers);James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of
Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942, 944 (1997) (highlighting the experiences of labor activists in the
early twentieth century, whose interpretations of the Constitution eventually brought about the
judicial view that picketing is a form of protected speech, as an example of how communities
have successfully advanced their own interpretations of the Constitution even after the Supreme
Court has ruled to the contrary).
42 See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 40, at 371-72 (citing the examples of Republican Senator
Dixon and the New York Post for their particularly outspoken belief that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 protected the right to free speech for all citizens); H.D. VA., THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF
1799-1800, TOUCHING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA
RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 1798, at 202 (1850) (reporting that Virginia's General Assembly
passed a resolution finding the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to be unconstitutional because
the Act "exercises a power. . expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amend-
ments... [and] because it is leveled against that right of freely examining public characters
and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which has ever been
justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right").
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duct-such as marches and boycotts-was a form of protected
speech.45 Nonetheless, despite pressures and influences on this score,
the core conceptual organizing principles used by judges up to this
time were different.
In the constitutional law of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, labor boycotts, strikes, and pickets were simply understood
not as speech but rather as conduct.4 At the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, labor unions seeking what would today be considered
routine objectives would have been considered criminal conspirators.
Business owners were understood to have private property rights in
their enterprises. A demand by an individual employee for better pay
43 See EMMA GOLDMAN, The Social Importance of the Modern School, in RED EMMA SPEAKS: AN
EMMA GOLDMAN READER, 140, 146-49 (Alix Kates Schulman ed., 1983) (arguing for women and
schools to be free to discuss sex and sexuality openly without the imposition of "[p]uritanic tyr-
anny" that "repudiates, as something vile and sinful, our deepest feelings ... [and] the real
functions of human emotions"); EMMA GOLDMAN, The Hypocrisy of Puritanism, in RED EMMA
SPEAKS, supra, at 150, 150-57 (charging Puritanism with causing government censorship, under
the guise of safeguarding against immorality, in such personal areas as "our views, feel-
ings, ... conduct[,] ... [a]rt, literature, the drama, the privacy of the mails, ... [and] our most
intimate tastes"); GURSTEIN, supra note 25, at 32, 63-65 (describing prominent sex reformers,
like Reverend Dr. Boynton, Ezra Heywood, and Stephen Pearl Andrews, as forces who pro-
moted sexual free speech when they "demand[ed] that the private mysteries of sex be made
public through lectures and pamphlets about sexual hygiene and morality"); THEODORE
SCHROEDER, A MUCH NEEDED DEFENCE FOR LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, SPEECH AND PRESS 22
(1906) (arguing that free speech extends to all forms of expression, including sexual speech, as
"' [t] he public interest requires that every difficult question [even questions of the hygiene, the
psychology and the ethics of sex] should be patiently and deliberately examined on all sides"').
"' See SCHROEDER, supra note 43, at 3, 10 (criticizing the prosecution of blasphemy as de-
stroying a "proper liberty of thought and conduct" and arguing that the prosecutors are "more
damaged than those whom they deter from expressing and defending unpopular opinions,
since.., only the former are depriving themselves of the chief means of correcting their own
errors"); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM
MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 400-23 (1993) (tracing the nineteenth century arguments concern-
ing why blasphemy should not be an offense, including the separation of church and state, the
freedom of speech, and the fact that Christianity does not determine America's laws).
45 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 41, at 945 (discussing the 10,000 Kansas coal miners in the early
twentieth century who protested against the Kansas Industrial Court Act, which prohibited
strikes, and sought to classify boycotts and strikes as a form of protected speech).
" Both opponents and proponents of categorizing these behaviors as speech agree that
these behaviors were historically deemed "conduct." See E. Merrick Dodd, Picketing and Free
Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513, 520 n.19 (1943) (noting that the concept of picketing as
constitutionally-protected free speech is relatively new and was only first suggested by Justice
Brandeis in his Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5 decision in 1937); Ludwig Teller,
Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REV. 180, 204 (1943) ("As recently as a decade ago, neither
the judiciary nor students of labor law had yet conceived of the practice of picketing as an exer-
cise of the right to free speech. It was generally agreed... that picketing was a tort; and the
bone of contention was whether it was a tort per se without hope of legality, or whether it was
but a prima facie tort which, like any other form of labor activity, could be justified in a given
case."); see also GRABER, supra note 39, at 253 n.4 (acknowledging that progressive thinkers be-
tween 1911 and 1915 occasionally discussed the free speech issues raised by a labor injunction
and the right to speak on public property). The Senn decision is discussed in detail below. See
infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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or working conditions was considered unambiguously legal. But once
that employee worked collectively with others to pressure the busi-
ness owner, he was understood to be "conspiring" to coerce the
owner with the threat of injuring him. This was considered by the
law-and by many besides-as a form of blackmail. Just as the law
today would never consider a threat to break someone's arm if a cer-
tain sum were not paid to be constitutionally protected speech,
threats by groups of employees acting in concert to strike, boycott,
and ruin businesses if their demands were not met were not consid-
41ered free speech. It is important to note that this is not simply a
case of conservative, pro-business judges, overly solicitous of property
rights, buying into the blackmail framework as against union claims
that their activities were a form of constitutionally protected speech.
Arguing that strikes, boycotts, and pickets might be a form of speech
was not a widely-used aspect of the labor argument itself until the
1930s. Understanding this conduct as speech was a constitutional
construction and a politically constructed developmental phenome-
non.
Many liberal reformers did not approve of assertions of economic
power by labor unions when they were justified as such-that is, of
the collective power of labor asserted as leverage in the fight against
the collective power of capital. Liberal reformers, as much as the pro-
business judges, were content with seeing such conduct (as with, for
example, secondary boycotts) punished by law. In a highly significant
strategic decision made during the test case of Gompers v. Buck's Stove
& Range Co.,45 Samuel Gompers (despite some resistance by labor
radicals who disdained rights claims over a resort to power) laid the
groundwork for a political alliance with these reformers by anchoring
his argument in claims on behalf of free press and free speech and, in
turn, anchoring those arguments in an appeal to natural rights. In-
deed, Gompers' strategic decision, which Daniel Ernst describes as "a
crucible of interest-group formation,, 49 represented a countermove to
that of James Wallace Van Cleave, the head of the Buck's Stove and
" See DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE
LIBERALISM 2, 132-40 (1995) (explaining how lawmakers sought to distinguish legitimate from
illegitimate assertions of collective labor bargaining power, and categorized threats to strike and
boycott as illegitimate); HATrAM, supra note 9, at 146-47 (recounting the decision in People v.
Wilzig that, while admitting that some forms of collective action were permitted, held that work-
ers boycotting their employers were guilty of intimidation, using the vague rationale that the
workers' actions during the dispute were intimidating "because of the size of the protest and
the workers' attitude of menace"); KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 23, at 107 (describ-
ing how "[s] triking workers and their supporters were routinely charged with conspiracy, crimi-
nal libel, vagrancy, and disturbing the peace").
" 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (concerning the legality of ajudicial injunction involving a sec-
ondary boycott).
49 ERNST, supra note 47, at 111.
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Range Company and an industry leader who had just been named
the President of the National Association of Manufacturers. Van
Cleave had taken an aggressive anti-union stance not simply, or even
mainly, on behalf of his company but rather, as Ernst reports, "as part
of a broad strategy to unite proprietary capitalists into a politically ef-
fective force." 50 The Buck's Stove case, far from being an arcane doc-
trinal byway, Ernst reports, became "a household name."5' It was a
prominent point of reference in the 1908 presidential campaign be-
tween William Howard Taft (himself a former pro-injunction judge)
and William Jennings Bryan (to whose campaign Gompers and the
AFL signed on) .5 And soon after the election, Gompers' sentencing
o Id. Ernst notes that the historical significance of Buck's Stove lies outside the courts and
the immediate legal controversy:
From the start, neither [side] valued the case solely or even primarily for the chance it
presented to break new doctrinal ground on the legality of the secondary boycott or the
labor injunction. Each side was far more concerned with using the litigation to cement
their constituencies behind their leadership and to win allies who would prove useful
when the battleground shifted to Congress. These concerns... help explain the liti-
gants' preference for an a priori, natural-rights jurisprudence when that position had
been abandoned by leading legal academics and the younger and more scholarly mem-
bers of the judiciary. Mixing the language of the courtroom with the language of the
stump, natural-rights jurisprudence served the litigants' dual purpose, and it was the na-
tive tongue of the lawyer-politicians arrayed on either side of the dispute.
Id. at 145. Ernst further argues that Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury Hatters), 208 U.S. 274 (1908),
which unanimously held that an AFL effort to unionize hatters through using a secondary boy-
cott was unlawful, and Buck's Stove
were significant less for their contribution to legal doctrine than for their impact on
leading political figures and public debate. The lawsuits put the law of industrial dis-
putes high on the national agenda for the first time since the Debs litigation of 1894-95.
With each step in their long progress through the courts they unleashed waves of public
comment, with significant consequences for congressional and presidential elections be-
tween 1906 and 1912 and on federal legislation between 1908 and 1914.
Id. at 110; see also RABBAN, supra note 38, at 171 (pointing out Samuel Gompers' decision to in-
voke the First Amendment and retain a prominent attorney and former Democratic presiden-
tial candidate as evidence that the Buck's Stove decision was intended to, and did, have a much
greater impact than simply resolving the labor dispute directly before the court); Ken I. Kersch,
The Gompers v. Buck's Stove Saga: A Constitutional Case Study in Dialogue, Resistance, and the Freedom
of Speech, 31 J. SuP. CT. HIST. (forthcoming Apr. 2006) (manuscript at 1-2, on file with author)
[hereinafter Kersch, The Gompers v. Buck's Stove Saga] (arguing that, although the Buck's Stove
ruling was not decided on the grounds of free speech doctrine, it was arguably the "first great
decision regarding freedom of speech").
" ERNST, supra note 47, at 147. Ernst, by contrast, describes the now more famous Danbury
Hatters' case as "a quieter drama with humbler participants." Id. But see See End of Boycott in
$222,000 Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1910, at 2 (describing the "famous Danbury hat case" as "of
equal importance with the Buck's Stove case" in that both "established the most important prin-
ciples affecting the boycott ever laid down").
12 See Gompers Indorsed on Bryan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1908, at 13 (reporting the American
Federation of Labor's endorsement of Gompers' support for Bryan in the presidential elec-
tion); Gompers Begs Labor to Work for Bryan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1908, at 2 ("Gompers called upon
organized abor [sic] to... vote for... [and] use its influence for Bryan."); Gompers Anxious to be
Put inJai, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1908, at 16 (reporting Gompers' desire to receive a verdict in the
contempt case against him before the presidential election); Gompers Worries Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1908, at 3 (reporting alarm of union leaders over Gompers' pledge to support Bryan).
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also captured the nation's attention-leading, on occasion, to mass
protests. 5  In his courtroom speech immediately prior to sentencing,
Gompers made an emotional appeal to the freedom of speech and of
the press. 4 With his wife and daughter in attendance, he wept as the
" See, e.g., Big Boston Labor Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1909, at 3 ("As a demonstration
against the sentences of imprisonment imposed by Judge Wright... upon... Samuel Gomp-
ers... in the Buck's Stove case, more than 5,000 members of labor unions paraded through the
streets of [Boston], and a large meeting was held in Faneuil Hall, while several overflow meet-
ings in the surrounding streets attracted large crowds."); Gompers Drops Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 1908, at 4 (reporting the Central Federated Union's adoption of resolutions declaring
Gompers guiltless, "denouncing the use of the injunction in labor cases as destructive of lib-
erty[, and] ... arrangting] mass meetings all over the city for action on the matter"); LaborDeci-
sion Denounced, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1909, at 1 (reporting the Dallas Trades Assembly's passage of
a resolution denouncing Gompers' sentence); Protest from Porto [sic] Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1909, at C4 ("The Porto [sic] Ricans protest against the sentencing of Samuel Gompers . .. ");
Seek Gompers' Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1908, at 18 (reporting the Central Labor Union of
Pittston's petition signed by 20,000 union workers asking President Theodore Roosevelt to par-
don Gompers). But see Van Cleave Reopens Injunction Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1908, at 4 (de-
scribing Van Cleave's declaration "for a continuation of the warfare" against Gompers and
other labor leaders as they attempt to change the injunction laws).
See 2 SAMUEL GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 213-15
(1925) (reprinting full text of Gompers' speech); see also WILL CHASAN, SAMUEL GOMPERS:
LEADER OF AMERICAN LABOR 111-12 (1971) (describing Gompers' pre-sentencing speech as "an
eloquent defense of the right to dissent"); ROWLAND HILL HARVEY, SAMUEL GOMPERS:
CHAMPION OF THE TOILING MASSES 160 (Octagon Books 1975) (1935) ("When what he believed
to be human rights were threatened, Gompers flamed forth unquenchable."); cf Letter from
Samuel Gompers to the Executive Council of the AFL (Dec. 31, 1907), in 7 THE SAMUEL
GOMPERS PAPERS 290 (Stuart B. Kaufman et al. eds., 1999) (characterizing Buck's Stove as "a
question of personal liberty, personal rights"); LOUIS S. REED, THE LABOR PHILOSOPHY OF
SAMUEL GOMPERS 125 (1930) ("So unjust did Gompers deem this injunction, so flagrant a viola-
tion was it of the right of free speech, that he decided the only possible course was to disobey it,
which he did."); Samuel Gompers, Free Speech and the Injunction Order, 36 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 255, 262 (1910) ("On account of the fundamental issues of free press and free
speech.., we preferred to stand upon the unconstitutionality of the injunction. .. ."); Affirms Jail
Termsfor Labor Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1909, at 7 (reporting Gompers' statement that "I can
not surrender constitutionally guaranteed rights because ajudge will issue an injunction invad-
ing and denying these rights," and that "if I must go to jail I shall bear the prison sentence with
fortitude, conscious that I have nothing to regret in any actions or utterances of mine which
some of the Judges... have construed into a breach of the law"); Gompers Defies Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1908, at 1 (reporting that Gompers, in an editorial in The American Federationist,
announced his intention to disobey the injunction because it violated free speech rights); Gomp-
ers Defies the Courts Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1909, at 2 (reporting that in Gompers' speech to
500 laborers, he declared that the injunction "invades the guarantees of the Constitution");
Gompers Denies Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1912, at 2 (reporting Gompers' testimony that "his
speeches were based on his understanding of the American right of free speech"); Gompers Raps
the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1909, at 18 (reporting Gompers' statement that "[t] he right of the
suppression of the freedom of speech and the prevention of the peaceable assemblage of peo-
ple is exercised by a nation only when the Government is threatened, yet what the United States
exercises only under such circumstances is used forever and a day for the benefit of a stove and
range"); Gompers Speaks for Labor, 38 MCCLURE'S MAGAZINE, Feb. 1912, at 371, reprinted in 8 THE
SAMUEL GOMPERS PAPERS 348 (Peter J. Albert & Grace Palladino eds., 2001) (describing the
right to boycott as a fundamental right of labor organizations "without which freedom, free
economic society, cannot exist"); Gompers Stirs Up Civic Federation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1909, at 6
(reporting that Gompers, in an unannounced speech at the National Civic Federation meeting,
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judge pronounced a sentence upon him of one year in jail.55 The
case was argued in such a way as to win the maximum number of po-
litical allies, primarily through anchoring a free speech argument in
an appeal to natural rights (despite the ostensible rejection of natural
rights claims in the progressive academy and by liberals and the
left) .
Several years later, in one of its most significant free speech deci-
sions, Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
cited the Buck's Stove case immediately following his famous formula-
tion that "[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic" for the proposition that "it does not even protect a man from
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of
force." " Nevertheless, several treatise writers subsequently picked up
"opened verbal fire" against the lawyers and political economists who previously spoke against
boycotts and strikes and stated that "free speech and free press were enjoined perpetually" by
the Buck's Stove decision); Jail for Gompers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1909, at 10 (reporting Gompers'
statement that "[i]n case of a dispute with employers a Judge can now permanently rivet your
jaws and lips[, which forces you to] not utter the very thoughts that God has put into your
mind"); Labor Appeal Ready for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1909, at 4 (reporting that
Gompers' petition to the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari alleged that the lower court's
holding violated the freedom of speech); Labor Condemns Language of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 1909, at 6 (reporting the American Federation of Labor's adoption of the position taken by
Gompers, and denunciation of the Buck's Stove decision as infringing the rights of speech, press,
and assembly); Unions in Europe Firm, Says Gompers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1909, at 7 (reporting
Gompers' statement that he was "ready to go to prison ... in defense of the right of American
speech"). But see Gompers Gratified, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1911, at 6 (reporting that Gompers,
while gratified that the Supreme Court had set aside the jail sentences, was disappointed that
the Court did not hold that the First Amendment protects boycotts); Lucky Mr. Gompers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 1911, at 12 (portraying the Buck's Stove company as "harassed by the abuse of
freedom of speech and press" and noting that the Supreme Court's opinion, while reversing
Gompers' sentence, was a victory for the public in that it failed to "leave room for the inference
that the Federation is at liberty to boycott at will"). See generally BERNARD MANDEL, SAMUEL
GOMPERS: A BIOGRAPHY 264-83 (1963) (providing a history of the Buck's Stove saga from the
acts leading up to the issuing of the injunction through the Supreme Court's reversal of Gomp-
ers' sentence).
55 See Jail for Gompers in Contempt Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1908, at 1 (reporting thatJudge
Wright issued a one-year prison sentence to Gompers and his co-defendants for disregarding
the injunction); Reduced Sentences for Labor Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1908, at 2 (reporting the
likelihood of President Roosevelt reducing the sentences of Gompers and his co-defendants);
Roosevelt Holds Labor leaders' Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1908, at 1 (reporting the possibility of
President Theodore Roosevelt pardoning one or more of the defendants in Buck's Stove).
See Kersch, The Gompers v. Buck's Stove Saga, supra note 50 (manuscript at 48, on file with
author) ("From the very beginning, Gompers recognized that the best way to galvanize public
attention, and win public and labor movement sympathy, in service of these ends, was to frame
the case as a twilight battle over the God-given and constitutional right of the freedom of
speech."). See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986) (dis-
cussing the strategic use of distinct rhetorics to unite political supporters and divide political
opponents).
57 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citing Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439
(1911)).
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the identification of behavior that had heretofore been understood
as action, such as boycotting and picketing, with speech. These in-
cluded Henry Schofield's Essays on Constitutional Law and Equity and
Other Subjects, which examines whether calls for strikes made in
"peacefully persuasive" publications that characterize the employer as
"unfair to labor" and add the employer to a "do not patronize" list
amount to "unlawful acts" or are more appropriatel' considered
speech constitutionally protected by liberty of the press.
At the time of the Buck's Stove case, boycotts, strikes, and (our
chief focus here) picketing were considered tortious conduct that was
fully regulable under state law. However, an extended reformist cam-
paign led by the labor movement, progressives, and those soon to be
known as liberals successfully challenged "government by injunction"
and statutorily altered these common law rules. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 193259 (along with the "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts"
passed by many states) continued to conceptualize labor picketing as
conduct, but nevertheless sanctioned it when it was directed at a law-
ful purpose in a labor dispute. In other words, picketing was conduct
that as a default rule was generally forbidden, but could be permitted
if justified. At the height of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937,
both the little Norris-LaGuardia Acts and the federal Act faced consti-
tutional challenges on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment property
rights grounds. Challengers argued that the laws licensed picketers
to destroy private businesses through conduct in a way that violated
the business owners' rights. The Supreme Court, however, rejected
these claims and upheld the constitutionality of these anti-injunction
acts. 6°
It was in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, a decision involving the
constitutionality of Wisconsin's little Norris-LaGuardia law, that the
Court, in dicta, first referred to picketing as a form of speech, not
' 2 HENRY SCHOFIELD, ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY AND OTHER SUBJECTS
557 (Nw. Law Sch. Faculty ed., 1921).
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2000).
See Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468, 481-82 (1937)
("There is nothing in the Federal Constitution which forbids unions from competing with non-
union concerns for customers by means of picketing as freely as one merchant competes with
another by means of advertisements in the press, by circulars, or by his window display."); see
also KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 180-86 (describing the Senn deci-
sion as holding that the "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" had a legitimate purpose in that they
were advancing workers' collective interest, but that this was a matter of state policy, rather than
a concern for the Supreme Court, as "'[a] hoped-for job is not property guaranteed by the Con-
stitution'" (quoting Senn, 301 U.S. at 481-82)); cf Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330
(1938) (upholding the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wisconsin Labor Code's schemes for
regulating labor disputes because the conflict at issue did not constitute a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of the Act, and an injunction would be overly broad, but failing to address the case
on constitutional grounds).
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conduct. The Court did this by asserting that "[m] embers of a union
might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make known
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution.' Justice Brandeis's invocation of the free-
dom of speech had significant consequences. Both the terms of the
ruling itself and Justice Brandeis's free speech dictum guaranteed
that labor pickets would be legal in a way that they were not prior to
the passage of the anti-injunction acts. However, conceiving of pick-
ets as speech promised to significantly alter the default rule. Under
the ruling itself, pickets were generally forbidden, but could be per-
mitted ifjustified. Under a free speech standard, however, as that law
was being developed, the rule was exactly the opposite: speech was
assumed to be permitted and could be restricted only if it could be
shown to present a "clear and present danger., 62 Inquiry into the ob-
jective of the picketing (the key inquiry under the Norris-LaGuardia-
type standards) would be inappropriate if picketing were a form of
free speech. 3  Moreover, a free speech standard would shift the
venue in which such issues were decided: it would make all of these
cases, once considered state law questions for state courts, into fed-
eral law questions for federal courts, nationalizing the issue in the
process.
Brandeis's dictum in Senn clearly stirred the pot: some state court
decisions adopted it as controlling law;65 others gave it a verbal nod
61 Senn, 301 U.S. at 478.
62 See Teller, supra note 46, at 195-96 ("If picketing is a form of free speech, it may not be
enjoined although carried on for an improper objective. Only a clear and imminently present
danger of substantial magnitude to the security of the government... justifies the restraint of
free and peaceful expressions."); see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
("[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.... That is
why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger... ." (citation omit-
ted)).
0 See Teller, supra note 46, at 182 ("[T]he Supreme Court apparently meant [in Senn] that
the practice of picketing was thereby removed from the category of a prima facie tort burdened
with the task of proving justification. Instead its basis became the constitutional right to free
expression-with all the breadth and feeling which the right involves, and the immunity in
which it imports."); see also Dodd, supra note 46, at 514 (arguing that picketing is purposive
speech and that since the Constitution protects purposive speech the Constitution protects
picketing).
m See Teller, supra note 46, at 182 (explaining that if picketing were considered free speech
"the propriety of limitations upon picketing.., becomes a federal question, and therefore the
Supreme Court, rather than the many state courts, [is] vested with final jurisdiction over picket-
ing cases").
6 See, e.g., Denver Local Union No. 13 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Perry Truck Lines, 101
P.2d 436, 441, 448 (Colo. 1940) (quoting at length from Senn, and placing "great weight" on it
in determining that laborers "could not legally be enjoined from peaceful picketing"); People v.
Harris, 91 P.2d 989, 993 (Colo. 1939) (quoting Senn to uphold acquittal of picketer on the
grounds that his conduct was protected by the First Amendment); City of Reno v. Second Judi-
cial Dist. Court, 95 P.2d 994, 1004 (Nev. 1939) (stating that Senn's "intimation that such picket-
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while nonetheless appearing not to give it too much weight by up-
holding the legality of banning the pickets or by distinguishing the
absolute right of property from the qualified privilege of speech;'
and still others ignored the dictum (and even the Senn opinion) alto-
gether.6v A contemporaneous commentator, however, rightly pre-
dicted that "[f]uture resort to freedom of speech doctrines seems
likely in these cases."ss This proved prescient. In Hague v. Committee
for Industrial Organization,69 the Court decided to afford protection to
picketing (and other labor union activities, such as the distribution of
leaflets) on free speech grounds.7" In this case, the Court upheld an
injunction preventing Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague from enforcing
a permit system that had been used repeatedly to deny the union's
use of public halls and parks as part of an organizing campaign.7'
This was a major step for the Court, which translated Brandeis's Senn
dictum into law. This step was not taken lightly, however, as can be
seen in the doctrinally significant fragmentation of the Hague opin-
ion, with three opinions concurring in the result: the first (for the
Court) by Justices Owen Roberts and Black; the second by Justices
ing is protected by the constitutional guaranty of free speech, is too plain to be misunder-
stood"); San Angelo v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen, Local 103, 139 S.W.2d
843, 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (citing Senn in support of the proposition that peaceful picket-
ing enjoys constitutional immunity); see also Teller, supra note 46, at 183 n.9 (listing state court
decisions that incorporated the Senn dictum and concluded that picketing is a form of free
speech).
See, e.g., Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 753, 35 N.E.2d 349, 354 (Ill. 1941)
(noting that peaceful picketing was a protected form of speech but nonetheless upholding a
statute that limited picketing insofar as it was threatening or intimidating); Roth v. Local Union
No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union, 24 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ind. 1939) (recognizing that picketing is a
protected form of speech but nonetheless permitting an injunction against picketing that has a
coercive purpose); Mitnick v. Furniture Workers Union, Local No. 66, 200 A. 553, 555-56 (N.J.
Ch. 1938), appeal dismissed, 4 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1939) (holding that "the so-called right of free
speech," and thus picketing, was only a qualified constitutional right and that acts in question
constituted a public nuisance that was destructive of the absolute property rights of the em-
ployer and his customers); Crosby v. Rath, 25 N.E.2d 934, 935 (Ohio 1940) (holding that pick-
eting is permitted only as part of a "legitimate trade dispute"); see also Teller, supra note 46, at
183 nn.10-11 (referencing decisions that "paid [Senn's dictum] no more than verbal homage"
or limited its reach).
6' See, e.g., Brickley Dairy Co. v. United Dairy Workers, 2 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 526, 528 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1940) (neglecting Senn and enjoining union from picketing); Euclid Candy Co. v.
Summa, 19 N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y. Sup, Ct. 1940) (same); Feldman v. Weiner, 17 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1940) (same); Lyle v. Local No. 452, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen,
124 S.W.2d 701 (Tenn. 1939) (same); Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
(same); see also Teller, supra note 46, at 183 n.13 (citing decisions that failed to refer to
Brandeis's Senn dictum).
m Erwin B. Ellmann, Comment, Labor Law-When a "Labor Dispute" Exists Within Meaning of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1146, 1166 n.71 (1938).
" 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
70 See id. at 516 (describing the potential for the city's ordinance to "be made the instrument
of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs").
71 Id. at 502.
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Stone and Reed; and the third by Justice Hughes (who, in relevant
substance,joined Roberts and Black). Justices Frankfurter and Doug-
las did not participate in the decision, and Justices Butler and
McReynolds dissented.
Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court frames the question pre-
sented by the Hague case as:
[W]hether freedom to disseminate information concerning the provi-
sions of the National Labor Relations Act, to assemble peaceably for dis-
cussion of the Act, and of the opportunities and advantages offered by it,
is a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States secured against
state abridgement by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Justice Stone's concurrence, however, calls into question and rejects
two seemingly conservative aspects of this framing. The first is that
while Justice Roberts anchors the decision in free speech concerns,
he simultaneously maintains a commitment to weighing the objective
or purpose of the conduct at issue v3 (a consideration, as we have seen,
central to the initial stage of the pro-labor turn in the labor statutes
of the early 1930s). The second is that, in anchoring the First
Amendment's free speech protection against the state via the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice
Roberts' framing limits the reach of the protection to citizens rather
than all "persons. 7 4 Justice Stone notes that although the findings of
the lower court and the evidence demonstrate that the purpose of
the CIO was "to organize labor unions in various industries in order
to secure to workers the benefits of collective bargaining with respect
to betterment of wages, hours of work and other terms and condi-
tions of employment,, 75 there were no findings or evidence as to
whether the industries at issue were subject to the National Labor Re-
lations Act or the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
Nor was there evidence as to whether the Act was discussed 6 In con-
trast to the limiting language of the Roberts opinion, Justice Stone
points out that the initial lower court injunction:
is not restricted to the protection of the right, said to pertain to United
States citizenship, to disseminate information about the Wagner Act. On
72 Id. at 512. Justice Roberts adds emphatically that, "[t]his is the narrow question presented
by the record, and we confine our decision to it." Id.
" Id. at 521-23 (Stone, J., concurring) (finding that "the freedom of respondents with
which the petitioners have interfered is the 'freedom to disseminate information ... [and] to
assemble peaceably,'" while also noting the purpose behind holding public meetings without
the requisite permits (citation omitted)).
74 See id. at 522 ("[T]he right to assemble to discuss the advantages of the National Labor
Relations Act is likewise a privilege secured by the privileges and immunities clause to citizens of
the United States, but not to others ...
"5 Id. at 523.
76 Id. ("Neither court below made any finding that the meetings were called to discuss, or
that they ever did in fact discuss, the National Labor Relations Act.").
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the contrary it extends and applies in the broadest terms to interferences
with respondents in holding any lawful meeting and disseminating any
lawful information by circular, leaflet, handbill and placard."
Justice Stone would make the right a due process right guaranteed to
all persons to hold meetings and disseminate information for any
,,71
"lawful purpose.
The Court took its definitive step in classifying picketing as speech
in Thornhill v. Alabama,79 a case involving a peaceful picket by AFL
members pursuant to a strike against the Brown Wood Preserving
Company in contravention of an Alabama law banning such pickets. °o
In Thornhill, arguments concerning "the right of peaceful assem-
blage," "the right to petition for redress," and, most prominently,
"the right of freedom of speech," were at the center of the decision.8 1
The Thornhill opinion, written by Justice Frank Murphy, the former
pro-labor governor of Michigan, was thick with a discussion of labor
picketing as a free speech right.2 It placed heavy emphasis on the
foundational nature of free speech, and the special role that that
freedom plays in the correction of error, the search for truth, and, in
turn, the successful conduct of democratic government.81 Citing a
modern context characterized by a broad, interconnected economic
system, Justice Murphy argued that freedom of speech concerning
labor relations was, under such conditions, of undeniable public im-
portance. At the same time, he avoided resting the decision on the
7 Id. at 524.
7 Id. at 525.
310 U.S. 88 (1940). OnlyJustice McReynolds dissented from the decision.
Id. at 91-92.
8 Id. at 93.
12 Id. at 94-95.
83 Justice Murphy emphasized that freedom of speech and of the press are among the "fun-
damental personal rights and liberties" that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgment by the states:
The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on mat-
ters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of educa-
tion and discussion is essential to free government. Those who won our independence
had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas
to discover and spread political and economic truth .... Abridgment of freedom of
speech and of the press... impairs those opportunities for public education that are es-
sential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of
popular government.... [T]he effective exercise of [these] rights [is] necessary to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
Id. at 95-96 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
14 Id. at 102 ("In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concern-
ing the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution."). In coming to such conclusion,Justice Murphy noted:
It is recognized now that satisfactory hours and wages and working conditions in industry
and a bargaining position which makes these possible have an importance which is not
less than the interests of those in the business or industry directly concerned. The
health of the present generation and of those as yet unborn may depend on these mat-
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ground that these pickets, because they were part of a labor dispute,
were permitted pursuant to a valid public purpose (the approach
sanctioned by the Court as recently as Justice Owen Roberts's opinion
in Hague). Following Justice Stone's Hague concurrence, Justice Mur-
phy held that the pickets were protected on the broad ground that
there existed a constitutionally protected "liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint
or fear of subsequent punishment." 5 As for the initial (post-Norris-
LaGuardia) liberal legal doctrine concerning picketing and labor in-
junction rights, which exempted labor disputes from the general rule
against pickets as tortious conduct, Murphy, citing John Milton, re-
jected the doctrine outright by characterizing it as a form of prior re-
straint involving a licensing system.86 Such systems had long been
considered anathema under Anglo-American common law because
they were viewed as striking at the heart of personal freedom.87 Might
ters, and the practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole
region and affect widespread systems of marketing. The merest glance at state and fed-
eral legislation on the subject demonstrates the force of the argument that labor rela-
tions are not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning the
conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny
of modem industrial society.
Id. at 103 (citations omitted). This ethos of interconnectivity was a pillar of the New Deal con-
stitutional thought. See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) (recogniz-
ing that the right of employees to unionize and engage in collective bargaining helps maintain
industrial peace and affects interstate commerce); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
393-94 (1937) (arguing that since the community is burdened when workers' "health, safety
and welfare are sacrificed or neglected," due to their unequal bargaining position with employ-
ers, the state has the power to interfere to ensure that workers stand on more equal footing);
Kersch, The New Deal Triumph as the End of History?, supra note 8 (manuscript at 216-17, on file
with editors) (arguing that the New Deal-era Supreme Court focused on the harmful effects of
unequal bargaining power on society as a whole, rather than solely focusing on the well-being of
individual workers, and noting that "[so long as the legislation in question was reasonably
aimed at alleviating the harms to labor as a class and served a broader, systemic regulatory pur-
pose that legislation would be presumed constitutional"). See generally THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE
EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORIT'Y (1977) (describing how interconnectivity
permeated social scientific thought in the late nineteenth century).
85 Thornhil, 310 U.S. at 101-02.
Id. at 97-98.
17 The following rationale was provided for requiring the Alabama law to be tested for con-
stitutionality on its face, free from any labor dispute requirement:
Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has never been deemed a requisite for
attack on the constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of
ideas.... [T]he rule is not based upon any assumption that application for the license
would be refused or would result in the imposition of other unlawful regulations. Rather
it derives from an appreciation of the character of the evil inherent in a licensing system.
The power of the licensor against which John Milton directed his assault by his "Appeal
for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing" is pernicious not merely by reason of the censure
of particular comments but by reason of the threat to censure comments on matters of
public concern. It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the per-
vasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of dis-
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picketing, even if conceived of as speech, lead others to action? Yes,
Murphy argued (echoing an argument that had been made by
Holmes in his famous Abrams dissentS), but he dismissed the concern
because "[e]very expression of opinion on matters that are important
has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather
than another group in society.0 9  The relevant test for picketing,
MuThy concluded, was whether it posed a clear and present dan-
ger.
With this, the Court's ideological reconstruction was complete.
Henceforth, conduct was re-imagined as speech, and the liberal ap-
proach which granted labor pickets a privilege in the face of a gen-
eral presumption against (tortious) pickets was dead. Picketing was
no longer presumed coercive conduct but was instead a constitution-
ally-protected individual right.9
C. How Speech Became Conduct
If understood in the terms set out in this Article, the Supreme
Court's conceptualization of labor picketing as constitutionally pro-
tected speech was a major expansion in the law of free speech. As
such, this line of labor decisions is fully consistent with familiar, lin-
ear narratives of progressive constitutional development of the free-
dom of speech. Not part of that narrative, however, is the simultane-
ous negotiation by administrative agencies and federal courts of the
"laboratory conditions" doctrine, which denied constitutional protec-
tion of the "pure speech" of employers critical of labor unions. This
cussion.... [The statute] is not any less effective or, if the restraint is not permissible,
less pernicious than the restraint on freedom of discussion imposed by the threat of cen-
sorship.
Id. at 97-98 (citations omitted).
m Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that,
based upon the theory of the Constitution, having one's ideas accepted in the competitive mar-
ket is the best test of truth and that an individual's wishes may best be carried out through
grounding his argument in truth).
Thornhil 310 U.S. at 104. He added "[T]he group in power at any moment may not im-
pose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely on
a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interest." Id.
o See id. at 104-05 ("Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where
the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test
the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.").
" See, e.g., Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943) (hold-
ing that a broad order preventing picketing violated the constitutional right to free speech on
the basis that peaceful picketing is a critical mechanism for union members to expose a labor
dispute to the public); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 774 (1942) (deciding that a state injunction against picketing was a viola-
tion of the right to free speech regardless of whether the parties were in a "labor dispute"); Am.
Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941) (concluding that a case involving picketing
presented a substantial claim to the right of free speech).
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doctrine, which is speech restrictive in many respects, seems (to bor-
row from Robert Post's terminology) largely "managerial." This is es-
pecially the case given that Post describes the logic of the managerial
domain as aimed at "organiz[ing] social life instrumentally to achieve
specific objectives, ' an orientation he characterizes as "fundamen-
tally incompatible with what are ordinarily regarded as the most basic
principles of general First Amendment doctrine."0' But to assign it to
this domain to the exclusion of others seems overly schematic. °
If such employers' speech were broadly protected, federal courts
and administrative agencies feared, it might have the effect of per-
suading a large number of workers not to join labor unions. In light
of the substantive goals of the Wagner Act, which had rested major
parts of the modern New Deal political order on the pillar of organ-
ized labor, this possibility was simply unacceptable.95 In the service of
the new order, it was necessary to restrict pure speech in this context.
Willard Wirtz, the post-war labor lawyer and Secretary of Labor in the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, called this "the regulation of
persuasion."96 One commentator concluded that, "Until the enact-
ment of the Wagner Act in 1935 the issue of what an employer might
lawfully say to his employees in the course of a labor dispute was no
issue at all; neither statute nor common law rule stayed
his... tongue. 97 That Act, however, as the foundation of the new
order, declared that "[i] t shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer.., to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the ex-
ercise of the [ir] [collective bargaining] rights" guaranteed elsewhere
in the Act.9 Such a provision, of course, did not act directly as a re-
straint on free speech. But it was not long before the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB"), as part of its project of consolidating the
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 6, at 2.
9' Id. at 15.
9' Post describes his domains as "democracy, which seeks to embody the purpose of self-
determination; management, which seeks to attain the benefits of instrumental reason; and
community, which seeks to sustain the identity implicit in common cultural norms." Id. The
laboratory conditions doctrine, as described below, can be plausibly described as falling within
any one of these domains. The secret of its success, it seems to me, is that it gestures at all three
simultaneously.
95 See KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 228-30 (discussing how the
Wagner Act was enacted, in part, to prevent employers from making coercive anti-union state-
ments that would stop their employees from joining unions, and how the pursuit of this goal
often conflicted with the employers' constitutional rights to free speech).
' See W. Willard Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board; Herein of "Employer Persuasion,"
49 Nw. U. L. REV. 594, 610 (1954) (noting the difficulties inherent in the regulation of persua-
sive speech in both the context of labor and political campaigns, which arise out of the gov-
ernmental interest in mitigating imbalance of power between parties).
97 Thomas G. S. Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations Act, 38
N.Y.U. L. REV. 243, 255 (1963).
9' National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (2000).
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power of the new regulatory order, began insisting on absolute neu-
trality of any employer's statement regarding the prospect of unioni-
zation. The Board interpreted this provision as rendering anti-
union statements made by employers as "unfair labor practices." In
the 1930s and early 1940s, for example, statements by employers ac-
cusing unions of "causing trouble," of being "outside agitators," "shy-
ster outfits," or "a bunch of Bolsheviks" all subjected employers to
NLRB sanctions.00 These decisions are particularly striking in light of
the Supreme Court's unanimous and simultaneous decision, in one
of its post-Thornhill picketing cases, to summarily brush aside em-
ployer complaints that pickets were hurling epithets "like 'unfair' or
'fascist,"' by noting that "loose language [and] undefined slo-
gans ... are part of the conventional give-and-take in our economic
and political controversies."' 0 '
9 E.g., Am. Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 129 (1942) (requiring employers to remain
neutral toward any election concerning unionization and to refrain from expressing views that
have the purpose of influencing the result of the election, notwithstanding the employers' right
to freedom of speech); see Allen Sinsheimer, Jr., Employer Free Speech: A Comparative Analysis, 14
U. CHI. L. REv. 617, 619 (1947) ("When the National Labor Relations Board first commenced
enforcement of the act it took the position that an employer had to be completely neutral.");
Note, Limitations upon an Employer's Right of Noncoercive Free Speech, 38 VA. L. REV. 1037, 1037-38
(1952) ("The Wagner Act contained no specific reference to the employer's right to address
assembled employees on organizational matters. However, [the Act was] early interpreted by
the National Labor Relations Board to preclude such conduct. Since employees were protected
from interference, restraint, and coercion, the Board's position was that the employer must
maintain absolute neutrality while plant organizational activities were under way.").
1o See, e.g., Leitz Carpet Corp., 27 N.L.R.B. 235, 237-38 (1940) (finding that it was "coercive"
for an employer to refer to union representatives as "shyster outfits"); Huch Leather Co., 11
N.L.R.B. 394, 401-02 (1939) (holding that an employer statement that the CIO amounted to "a
bunch of Bolsheviks" was an unfair labor practice); Am. Mfg. Concern, 7 N.L.R.B. 753, 762
(1938) (stating that it was "improper" for an employer to refer to union organizers as "outside
agitators"); Indianapolis Glove Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 231, 239, 250 (1938) (citing an employer's alle-
gations to his workers that a union's activities were "causing trouble" as support for the court's
finding that the employer engaged in unfair labor practices). These cases are cited in Ian M.
Adams & Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., Free Speech and Administrative Agency Deference: Section 8(c) and the
National Labor Relations Board-An Expostulation on Preserving the First Amendment, 22 J. CONTEMP.
L. 19, 22 n.19 (1996). Along the same lines, the ACLU in 1937 (in a memo written by Nathan
Greene, the progressive co-author with Felix Frankfurter of The Labor Injunction, and an ACLU
board member in the 1930s) backed the NLRB in this endeavor, ostensible devotion to the
freedom of speech and the press notwithstanding, and supported the NLRB's efforts to locate
the author of an unsigned anti-union editorial in a Pennsylvania newspaper. SAMUEL WALKER,
IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 101-02 (2d ed. 1990).
'0' Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943); see Note, su-
pra note 99, at 1038 (noting apparent conflict between the NLRB's theory, which the "Supreme
Court seemed to indorse," that an employer must maintain absolute neutrality and the Court's
statements in Thornhill that "the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor
dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Consti-
tution").
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Immediately following the passage of the Wagner Act, its effects
on free speech proved highly contentious.1 2 In perhaps the most fa-
mous dispute involving these free speech consequences, the Ford
Motor Company was censured by the NLRB for distributing anti-
union literature to its employees during a United Automobile Work-
ers of America ("UAW") organizing campaign. Included in this lit-
erature were pamphlets entitled "Ford Gives Viewpoint on Labor"
and cards labeled "Fordisms," with such sayings as "A monopoly of
JOBS in this country is just as bad as a monopoly of BREAD.' ' 4
In a world of ostensibly "expanded" protections for the freedom
of speech, the federal government's contention that it could ban the
dissemination of this literature would seem highly questionable. Re-
gardless, the Ford case completely divided the ACLU in deciding
which group it should side with-Ford or the NLRB:
When employers approached the ACLU seeking their support and asked
the civil liberties group whether or not the Constitution's right to free
speech applied to them, too, Roger Baldwin reported that the group's
governing board told them: "No, you have no rights of free speech
against unions now because the right to form a union is now a funda-
mental one under the National Labor Relations Act." When the employ-
ers then asked if they at least had the right to talk, the ACLU responded
by saying, no, they no longer had a right to talk.0 5
While the ACLU ultimately decided to support Ford, they only
agreed to oppose the NLRB to the extent that the Board's actions re-
stricted "non-coercive" employer speech.' 6
After the Ford case, the NLRB "evinced a sustained and decided
preference for the tight regulation of employer speech concerning
labor unions. ' '  Like the free speech doctrine re-conceptualizing
0'2 See WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, THE POLITICS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 47
(1985) (discussing the ACLU's internal struggle between remaining faithful to its primary pur-
pose of defending First Amendment rights while continuing to support labor unions, and not-
ing that "[t]he debate became the most acute test between those who valued free speech as an
end in itself and those who used it as a weapon for reform"); see also WALKER, supra note 100, at
103 (discussing the conflict within the ACLU between the ACLU leftists, who supported the
NLRB because they viewed the anti-union comments as coercive acts that present a clear and
present danger, and the moderates, who viewed the ACLU as "always [seeking] the 'freeing of
speech' and., never endors[ing] any restriction").
07 KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 229.
Id. (citing DONOHUE, supra note 102, at 47).
Id. (quoting DOHOHUE, supra note 102, at 48).
... Id. (citing DOHOHUE, supra note 102, at 48); see also WALKER, supra note 100, at 103 ("The
Ford case.., was not an either-or proposition. Instead, the ACLU should support the main
thrust of the NLRB's cease-and-desist order but oppose those sections restricting noncoercive
speech."). See generally NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940) (describing the
circumstances surrounding and legal issues involved in the dispute).
07 KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 229; cf Julius Getman, Labor Law
and Free Speech: The Curious Polity of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 19-22 (1984) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for its change from protecting the marketplace of ideas to its gradual ap-
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conduct as speech, the free speech doctrine re-conceptualizing
speech as conduct was not pronounced as diktat. It was, rather, ne-
gotiated over time in an interplay between the Board, Congress, and
the Supreme Court.0 8 While the NLRB's initial position was to en-
tirely forbid employers from communicating about unions (the "strict
neutrality" approach), the Board, after some prodding by the Su-
preme Court, changed its policy to distinguish between coercive and
non-coercive speech-the same distinction that the ACLU had drawn
in its dealings with Ford.'09 However, this distinction only led the
Board to construe the category of "coercion" broadly." In response
to this, Congress, as part of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, amended
the Wagner Act to clarify that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of re-
prisal or force or promise of benefit."
Following (and in partial resistance to) this amendment, the
NLRB adopted the "laboratory conditions" standard, which gave it
broad leeway to regulate employer speech during a union election
campaign. 112 "The Board justified its assertion of this regulatory au-
proval of the NLRB's laboratory conditions doctrine and assumption that an employer's speech
about unions is nearly always coercive). See generally Adams & Wyatt, supra note 100, at 22-34
(discussing the NLRB's policies of restricting employer speech in the context of union organi-
zation, and its views that any employer statement was generally coercive and constituted unfair
labor practices).
... See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 40, at 3-4 (arguing that dynamics between the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the public are a routine part of the American constitutional practice in
defining the right to freedom of speech).
'" KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 229; see NLRB v. Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 479 (1941) (holding that employer utterances alone, without threat of
retaliation, are "difficult to sustain a finding of coercion" and do not amount to prohibited
speech); NLRB v. Am. Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993, 995 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding that where
"there was no intimation of reprisal," an employer's statements regarding the feasibility of un-
ionization were protected speech). See generally HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM
THE WAGNER AcT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR
RELATIONS 174-89 (1950) (analyzing a number of employer-speech cases to demonstrate the
NLRB's gradual change, as a result of Supreme Court guidance, from requiring strict neutrality
to only prohibiting coercive conduct, to following a theory of "separability" between true speech
and unfair labor practices).
110 KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 229-30.
. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000); see Note, supra note 99, at 1047-50
(discussing the motivation behind and legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, which freed
"[a]n employer.., to address his employees upon union matters under any and all circum-
stances, so long as the language he used was not coercive").
112 See Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (asserting that the function of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board in overseeing a union election campaign is "to provide a labora-
tory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees"); see, e.g., P.D. Gwaltney, Jr. & Co., 74
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thority by asserting a federal interest in maintaining a 'pure' dia-
logue, untainted by (employer) overstatement. '113 This approach
clearly strayed far from Justice Holmes' marketplace of ideas model
of First Amendment liberties.'1 4 In the era of Alexander Meikeljohn,
N.L.R.B 371, 379-80 (1947) (setting aside a union board election because it was not held in a
manner conducive to free, unintimidated choice of the representatives); Maywood Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146, 150 (1945) (stating that an election will be set aside if it appears
that the employees were precluded from exercising free choice by coercive conduct that was
related to the election in such a manner as to affect the employees' decision); see also Mark
Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to
Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 793-94 (1994) (asserting that the laboratory condi-
tions standard provides safeguards against management influence over their employees' voting
choices and ensures "the proper conditions for communication among workers, union organiz-
ers, and employers"); Comment, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Repre-
sentation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1247 (1963) (noting that the NLRB used the laboratory
conditions standard to invalidate elections in situations where employers threatened, pressured,
or intimidated their workers).
"' KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 230; see Gen. Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. at 126 (justifying intervention in the election by asserting that an election serves its
true purpose only when "surrounding conditions enable employees to register a free and un-
trammeled choice for or against a bargaining representative").
" See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that, based upon the theory of the Constitution, having one's ideas accepted in the competitive
market is the best test of truth and that an individual's wishes may best be carried out through
grounding their argument in truth); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(citing "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"). But see Barenberg, supra note 112, at 796-97 ("By em-
phasizing the accessibility of relevant information about the empirical effects of unionization,
the laboratory-conditions standard resembles the 'marketplace of ideas' justification for consti-
tutional free speech rights. The key desideratum is to encourage the discovery of truth by en-
suring a sufficiently robust market in information.... The ideal deliberative procedure is de-
signed to neutralize the effect of relations of power and subordination on deliberative
procedure and outcomes."). Writing in the mid-1950s, W. Willard Wirtz insisted upon a rejec-
tion of the term "employer free speech," which in these cases he dubbed a form of "semantical
fraud," and opined that "[i]t is both too broad and too narrow, and it conceals a serious prob-
lem in the camouflage of a pleasant set of words." Wirtz, supra note 96, at 595-96. Wirtz then
continued:
Everyone is in favor of "speech," especially "free" speech, and there is no question about
an employer's right to it. But this phrase blurs and conceals the very real issue of how far
an employer should, as a policy question, be permitted to exert certain economic power
he may have, or, even more precisely, to exert that economic power through the me-
dium of speech. There is no better reason for identifying this problem as one of "em-
ployer free speech" than there would be for calling it the problem of "employer pressure
tactics," or of "employee freedom to vote."
Id. at 596. Wirtz criticized such inappropriate references in recent Board decisions to "broader
legal doctrines" (i.e., the First Amendment). Id. at 613. He added:
This presents neither more nor less a "free speech" issue than does employee picketing.
Yet the Board appears to be making now in the employer persuasion cases the same hol-
low, conceptualistic use of the phrase the Supreme Court did when it reached the tem-
porary decision [ Thornhill v. Alabama]-necessarily revised later [in Hughes v. Superior
Court] -that picketing, employee persuasion, was constitutionally protected free speech.
Id. (citations omitted). In the same article, Wirtz argued that the "new NLRB" of the Eisen-
hower administration, of which appointments to the Board were considered "offensive to many
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Thomas Emerson, and William Brennan, First Amendment protec-
tions ostensibly broadened. But rather than falling by the wayside,
federal regulatory efforts requiring pure dialogue, free of overstate-
ment, were accepted without challenge from civil libertarians right
through the Warren Era rights revolution. 115 Indeed, in 1969, at the
ostensible height of constitutional free speech latitudinarianism, the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. expressly approved of
the NLRB's "laboratory conditions" doctrine."" The negotiation of
the laboratory conditions doctrine might appear to be an interesting
oddity in free speech law-a minor, if notable, step backwards in a
regime broadly characterized by secular, linear progression. To see it
this way, however, is to miss its much broader significance. In devel-
oping the laboratory conditions doctrine, administrative agencies and
the courts fashioned a powerful alternative model for understanding
freedom of speech, a model that has significantly influenced constitu-
tional law. In many contemporary contexts, the Court (often implic-
itly) chooses between the marketplace and the laboratory conditions
models when resolving free speech questions. When it chooses the
marketplace model, the decision broadcasts itself as implicating clas-
sic freedom of speech questions. When the Court chooses the labo-
ratory conditions model, however, its decision typically declares that
the case is not one of free speech at all, but rather about "intimida-
tion" and "coercion"-in the same way that labor pickets were once
not considered speech at all, but a form of intimidation and coer-
people," retreated from the laboratory conditions doctrine. Id. at 611. If such proposition were
true even then (which is far from clear), then the retreat was shallow and short-lived.
115 See Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 67 (1964) (asserting that "the law has inevitably
been inserted into the process of communication to regulate the terms on which [such com-
munication] is conducted," and that while the imposition of these rules restricts speech con-
tent, it also guarantees both sides "a reasonable opportunity... to convey their views to the vot-
ers").
16 395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969) (reasoning that if an employer has effectively destroyed the
laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election, the "only fair way to effectuate employee
rights is to re-establish the conditions as they existed before the employer's unlawful cam-
paign"). In Gisse4 the employer warned, during a union organizing drive, that the Teamsters
Union was a "strike happy" outfit and that another strike at the company could drive them out
of business, at the cost of the employees' jobs. Id. at 588. The Court held that the employer
had no right to mention the possibility of a plant closing and stated that, to be allowed, such
prediction "must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's be-
lief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control." Id. at 618. Quoting the
appellate decision below, the Court stated that "[c]onveyance of the employer's belief, even
though sincere, that unionization will or may result in the closing of the plant is not a statement
of fact unless.., the eventuality of closing is capable of proof." lId at 618-19. The Court's Gis-
sel decision restricting employer speech is even more noteworthy in that it occurred in the same
year as Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), a cross-burning decision that is commonly
taken as the high point in free speech latitudinarianism for all other speech areas.
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cion. Thus, as free speech law moved "forward," it also moved "back-
ward."
The laboratory conditions doctrine-which (outside of the setting
in which it was formulated) is no longer named when practiced-is
the primary doctrine applied in cases involving racial and sexual har-
assment (including campus speech codes appearing under the guise
of harassment standards) and the regulation of speech during elec-
toral campaigns outside the labor context."7
The implications of the laboratory conditions doctrine for speech
involving racial issues were apparent from the beginning for those
willing to examine the arcane area of labor law dealing with the
NLRB's regulation of union election campaigns. The statist, mana-
gerial impulse behind the laboratory conditions doctrine was charac-
terized by a robust understanding of the fragile nature of rationality.
The NLRB saw its role in supervising these campaiqns as one of engi-
neering maximum rationality in union elections.18 One problem
that immediately arose, however, was that it quickly became apparent
to the Board that "[t]here are certain appeals which stimulate the
emotional processes in such a way as to make dispassionate delibera-
tion impossible." "9 Employer speech regarding the racial implica-
tions of unionization was soon spotlighted as a recurrent and signifi-
cant threat to dispassionate deliberation. The Board, in response, set
down the path of distinguishing "inflammatory race propaganda"
from "factual, germane, and temperate" utterances regarding race.1
20
A contemporaneous commentator in the Yale Law Journal held this
approach "not workable," noting that in reality "the results are likely
to turn on such 'emotional' factors as the trial examiners' or Board's
feelings toward the statements made by an employer during a repre-
sentation campaign.'' In many cases, this approach would simply
.. See Wirtz, supra note 96, at 610 (arguing for analogy between attempts to regulate coercive
employer speech and speech in political campaigns, where in both situations "it is exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to establish by law a freedom for voters to make up their own minds
without intruding further than seems advisable upon other related freedoms").
"' See Comment, supra note 112, at 1246-47 ("Since Taft-Hartley the Board's role has appar-
ently become that of a disinterested umpire of the contest between labor and management for
the workers' votes[.] ... [The Board now works to] insure that employees were free 'from all
elements which prevent or impede a reasoned choice.'") (internal citation omitted).
9 d. at 1250.
Id. at 1252; seeAllen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73, 75 (1962) (upholding the results
of an election to reject a union in which the employer made factual statements about the un-
ion's involvement in desegregation but did not resort to "inflammatory propaganda on matters
in no way related to the choice before the voters"); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71-72
(1962) (distinguishing between a propaganda campaign "calculatedly embarked on... so to
inflame racial prejudice," and other political campaigns where a party "truthfully set[s] forth
another party's position on matters of racial interest [but] does not deliberately seek to... ex-
acerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals").
1 Comment, supra note 112, at 1254.
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"deny employees an adequate opportunity to consider the issue of
race in deciding to accept or reject the union. Indeed it would be
tantamount to asserting that racial prejudice was an improper reason
for rejecting a union"' 12 2  "Such an assertion," the commentator
wrote, "desirable as it may be, seems inconsistent with the proper role
of an administrative agency and more specifically with the statutory
obligations of the Board." 2 As such, the purported "freedom of em-
ployee choice" would amount to a freedom "to choose only those
ends the Board or some other institution deems 'rational.' 24 The
commentator noted that if the policy of furthering racial integration
could be found in any statutory command, and if it was not presump-
tively forbidden by the Constitution ("[c]onstitutional commands
forbid governmental discrimination on the basis of race; they in no
way require affirmative governmental action to integrate the races"),
the Board might be able to forbid the mention of race in organiza-
tional campaigns. 125  Moreover-and especially significant for our
purposes here-even if this goal was commanded by statute and was
not plainly unconstitutional,
any promotion of racial integration by the Board [in this way] necessarily
involves a cost in terms of other values-those embodied in the specific
legislation which the agency is charged with enforcing (freedom of
choice) and those rooted in historic cultural experience (freedom of
speech and association). Basic principles of representative government
dictate that the official resolution of such major value conflicts does not
reside in administrative agencies. 126
In interpreting Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, courts have
held that employers have an affirmative obligation to "pre-
vent... bigots from expressing their opinions in a way that abuses or
offends their co-workers.' 27 Along these lines, employers may be sub-
jected to potential liability not only by ill-intentioned remarks but




12 Id. at 1255. Of course, in the next few years, constitutional understandings of the duty to
integrate were radically reconstructed. See KERSCH, CONSTRUcTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note
9, at 333-35 (discussing cases during the 1960s in which the U.S. Supreme Court expressed the
belief that it had "an affirmative duty to integrate" schools in order to eliminate racial discrimi-
nation).
126 Comment, supra note 112, at 1256.
127 Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988).
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cit. 1991) ("We note that the reasonable victim
standard we adopt today classifies conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers
do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile working environment. Well-intentioned com-
pliments by co-workers or supervisors can form the basis of a sexual harassment cause of action
if a reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff would consider the comments sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter a condition of employment and create an abusive working environ-
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ernmental policies set by the courts and the EEOC at the behest of
women's groups, employers today commonly ban sexist speech (typi-
cally defined broadly as any remarks that might make some women
feel uncomfortable), the use of sexual metaphors, and dirty jokes.'
9
Despite frequent professions of concern for the "chilling effect" of
overbroad or vague regulation concerning speech in other contexts,
the Supreme Court has never invalidated "hostile environment" regu-
lations under the First Amendment.
Sex-related workplace speech restrictions were directly derived
from existing prohibitions on racially-harassing speech in the work-
place. Beginning in the early 1970s with the Fifth Circuit's Rogers v.
EEOC decision, federal courts have held that race-related remarks
may constitute an illegally hostile workplace environment. 0 This re-
ment."). See Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree, 47 RUTGERS
L. REV. 579, 579 (1995) ("Even '(w)ell-intentioned compliments' may result in liability." (quot-
ing Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880)). Title VII provides specifically that "[it shall be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (2000). EEOC guidelines make sexual harassment a violation of Title VII. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2005).
" See WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 5 (1997) ("Harassment law.., began with cases where bosses had pres-
sured women for sexual favors but soon grew to encompass a sweeping new right to be free of a
hostile working environment as conveyed by co-workers' jokes, political and religious discussions, or
artwork or photos posted on the wall."). See generally Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481, 513 (1991) (assert-
ing that potentially offensive speech, which is generally protected under the First Amendment,
is impermissibly subjected to a greater degree of regulation in the workplace setting); Eugene
Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995) (claiming that
employees are overly censored by employers because employers seek to limit their potential li-
ability under existing unconstitutionally vague hostile-environment standards); Jonathan
Rauch, Offices and Gentlemen, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 1997, at 22, 23 (discussing how em-
ployers are now required to "police 'discriminatory' speech" in the workplace, despite free-
speech principles, in response to a growing social and legal trend that recognizes "bigoted or
offensive speech [as] a form of illegal discrimination").
,0 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1971). Rogers has been cited as an important
case for its recognition of a congressionally delegated power to alleviate race discrimination. See
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing
Rogers for the proposition that the language of Title VII "evinces a Congressional intention to
define discrimination in the broadest possible terms" (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238)). The
court in Rogers did assert, though, that it did "not wish to be interpreted as holding that an em-
ployer's mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in the
employee" triggers Title VII protection. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. See generally DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN'T SAY THAT! THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 23-34 (2003) (noting that feminist legal scholars in the late 19
7
0s suc-
cessfully argued that employment discrimination laws should encompass sexual harassment,
while criticizing anti-discrimination laws as a threat to civil liberties); Lillian R. BeVier, Intersec-
tion and Divergence: Some Reflections on the Warren Court, Civil Rights, and the First Amendment, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1075 (2002) (noting that the Warren Court protected free speech to pro-
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striction on workplace speech is traceable to the NLRB's restrictions
on workplace speech concerning labor unions during the post-New
Deal era. These restrictions came to be justified by the Board, and
were ratified by the Supreme Court, by the laboratory conditions doc-
trine. Indeed, this lineage has been made explicit by contemporary
feminist legal scholars who have cited Gissel and other NLRB deci-
sions from the 1940s as support for their arguments for the curtail-
ment of sex-related workplace speech. One such scholar, in arguing
for such restrictions, asserted that:
Even employers have limited rights of expression on the job. For exam-
ple, an employer cannot engage in speech that could unfairly interfere
with a union election. This restriction on employer expression isjustified
by the state's interest in ensuring the adequate protection of workers'
rights. A similar logic may be applied to sexual harassment law. ... "'
mote racial equality and analyzing Warren Court decisions in an attempt to understand the re-
percussions of rooting First Amendment decisions in a civil rights era context).
3' Deborah Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as Gender-Based Discriminatory
(Mis)Treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649, 657 (1997) (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969)), quoted in KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 232. The field is
replete with scholarly work examining the different contexts in which speech can be regulated
in different ways. See, e.g., MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2354-55 (1989) (discussing limitations placed on free speech in
such contexts as commerce and industrial relations, including employer speech during union
elections; political activity by government employees; speech by children and prisoners; privacy
and defamation; and public order infringement, including "[b]omb threats, incitements to riot,
'fighting words,' and obscene phone calls"); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 289 (1991) (arguing that racist speech is necessarily
treated differently in public and private contexts); Robert C. Post, The Perils of Conceptualism: A
Response to Professor Fallon, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1744, 1746 (1990) ("There are circumstances in
which speech ought to be regulated according to principles quite distinct from those that un-
derlie public discourse. To offer an obvious example, speech that is appropriately protected
when it occurs within the public discourse is also appropriately regulated as racial or sexual
harassment when it occurs within the context of an employment relationship."); James
Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REV.
163, 173-74, 247 (1992) (arguing that while completely outlawing hate speech on campuses
would violate basic free speech principles, campus administrators have considerable leeway,
consistent with the First Amendment, to "prohibit certain types of hate speech inimical to the
purposes of the various campus forums," as long as such speech is not prohibited for symbolic
reasons); Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment,
the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403, 408-09 (1991) (con-
tending that workplace sexual harassment laws may restrict employers' speech without violating
the First Amendment). But see Browne, supra note 129, at 484 (arguing that offensive speech
and coworker harassment may not be regulated on the basis of content without violating the
First Amendment, as such speech does not fall entirely into any of the recognized exceptions to
First Amendment protection, such as defamation, obscenity, or "fighting words"); Richard H.
Fallon,Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 19-20 ("[T]he regulation of workplace speech that creates a sexually hostile
environment seems to presuppose some new category of regulable speech under the First
Amendment .... [However,] [n]o opinion of the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized a
'workplace speech doctrine' permitting the government to engage in content-based regulation
of employee speech in private workplaces."); Jessica M. Karner, Comment, Political Speech, Sexual
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As labor law scholar Mark Barenberg has noted, this approach, which
he explicitly links to "early interpreters of the Wagner Act," is today
central to [the] ideal of 'egalitarian deliberation' that informs an array of
current views about collective choice in social and political theory, rang-
ing from civic republicanism, to radical or socialist democracy, to leading
liberal (e.g., John Rawls's) accounts of democratic process in a just soci-
ety, to a 'discourse ethics' of ideal communication.
The statist, bureaucratic, and managerial laboratory conditions
model of free speech, in other words, has become central to the ide-
ology and discourse of power in the modern American state.
CONCLUSION
Most legal scholarship concerning the freedom of speech tells a
story of short-term cycles of expansion and contraction together with
long-term secular, linear development. This narrative captures im-
portant elements of the trajectory of constitutional free speech doc-
trine over the course of the twentieth century. However, it tends to
obfuscate other dynamics within speech law, many of which are of
special political salience because they involve debates over whether a
particular controversy involves a free speech issue or not. A histori-
cally-informed political development approach to the freedom of
speech can help illuminate these important developmental dynamics.
The approach I have taken in this Article begins with what seems
to be the unremarkable acknowledgment that the freedom of speech
at a particular political moment and within a particular political or-
der might simultaneously be expanding and contracting. It maps a
single instance of this simultaneous expansion and contraction-
what I have called a free speech configuration-in a highly significant
area of law. Characteristically for a developmental study, it avoids a
snapshot approach (a feature of much normative work in this area)
that tries to ascertain, on its merits, whether a particular political ac-
tion or utterance is properly conceptualized as constitutionally pro-
tected "speech." Instead, it presents the configuration as a histori-
cally-situated constitutional settlement that is not arrived at in an
instant, but rather negotiated over time. I have demonstrated here,
Harassment, and a Captive Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REV. 637, 639-40 (1995) (arguing that since
"[w]orkplace harassment law has developed with little attention ... to First Amendment con-
cerns," a standard is needed to "allow[] for regulation of most workplace harassment, without
eroding all protection of workplace speech"); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and
Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1820-21 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court
"has never carved out any 'workplace speech' exception broad enough to justify harassment
law").
"2 Barenberg, supra note 112, at 795 (citations omitted).
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in this regard, how conduct became speech and speech became con-
duct.
Although I share with legal scholars a strong, animating interest in
the Supreme Court and the intricacies of legal doctrine (something
many "attitudinalist" political scientists do not), I, also characteristic
of political development scholars, refuse to treat the Court's negotia-
tion of legal doctrine in isolation from other political events and in-
stitutions.Ts For example, I have spotlighted parts of the negotiation
of new legal doctrine, and the decision of political actors to use con-
stitutional rhetoric to build and advance political coalitions. I have
also spotlighted the way in which moves and counter-moves amongst
the Court, Congress, and an administrative agency were at the core of
doctrinal development. At the broadest, "big picture" level, I have
argued that all of these developments took place within an ongoing
project involving the construction and consolidation of the New Deal
constitutional regime.
Like many critical scholars, I view the Court's role in this negotia-
tion as highly ideological and political. Unlike many attitudinal po-
litical scientists, I believe that understanding the politics of these de-
velopments is a much more interesting and complex endeavor than
simply charting the way the Court follows election returns or reflects
the appointment process. This less nuanced approach would lead us
to conclude that in the cases we have examined here, the Court voted
"with organized labor" and "for expanding civil liberties." The Court
certainly seems to have voted with organized labor-though, as I have
written elsewhere, it has become less protective of the speech rights
of individual workers in key contexts.' But as for "expanding" free
speech, the attitudinalists here simply borrow their categories from
traditional narratives.
131 Certainly, some legal scholars-particularly legal historians-have also discussed legal
doctrine in its political context. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 40, at 3 ("The[] free speech strug-
gles were not only about free speech. Fundamentally they were also struggles for democratic
government."); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 12 (2d ed. 1985) (ex-
plaining that his book "is a social history of American Law... [that] takes nothing as historical
accident, nothing as autonomous, everything as relative and molded by economy and society");
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY vii (1992) ("[T]he development of law cannot be understood independ-
ently of social context.").
"4 See, e.g., KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 180-86 (discussing the
Senn and Laufcases in which the Supreme Court sided with the labor unions at the expense of
individual workers because the unions were acting to advance workers' collective interests, a
"thoroughly legitimate purpose," while "there was no employee associational right"). But see
Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the
Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1-2 (1999) (arguing that in the 1960s,
courts began protecting the rights of individual workers at the expense of organized labor and
started adopting specific labor rules that "were profoundly disadvantageous to unions and
brought about a weakening of the American labor movement").
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While the political development approach I take does not pre-
clude normative approaches to the same questions, it emphasizes that
normative arguments are often undertaken according to salient
frameworks or models, such as the marketplace model and the labo-
ratory conditions model of free speech. The conclusion will often be
biased (if not determined) by the model deemed most appropriate
by the judge or the constitutional theorist, and the choice of model
will often be influenced (if not determined) by a reading of social
facts and the ambient social context that cannot be determined on
legal grounds, although it can be translated into legal doctrine. For
this reason, I have argued that changing conceptions of what types of
utterances and behaviors are considered coercive is crucial to this
area.
Political development approaches to civil liberties law promise
new insights into constitutional history and practice in the twentieth
century. In particular, these approaches reveal the way that rights-
claims, rather than simply serving as trumps, help to structure and
empower the dominant political regime.
Configurations of the sort I have identified here are pervasive.
Moreover, a focus on them may lead scholars not only to explore
configurations within a single area of civil liberties law-such as the
freedom of speech-but across them.135 In time, this may lead us to
broadly re-think the nature of the development of civil liberties doc-
trine over the course of the twentieth century. At a minimum, how-
ever, it will illuminate some under-discussed, yet highly significant,
areas of American constitutional law.
135 Elsewhere, for example, I have explored the ways in which shifting understandings of co-
ercion in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions (taking place simultaneously and
in direct engagement with developments in free speech law) affected configurations in that
area and beyond. See KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 303-36.
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